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24 October 1980

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BRIEFS

BATTLE REPORTS--Combat news review of the people and the people's army for last 9 months in north, east and northeastern Burma: the people and the people's army are continuously fighting and annihilating the enemy in the north, east and northeastern Burma. Over 650 small- and large-scale battles were fought between 19 November 1979 and 19 August 1980--a period of 9 months from when the Ne Win-san Yu military clique launched the allout offensive--operation "King Conqueror." During these battles, 1,728 enemy soldiers were killed, 3,073 were wounded, 309 were captured as prisoners of war, and 2 defected to the people's side. Hence, a total of over 5,100 enemy soldiers were annihilated. A total of 1,450 assorted weapons, including the following, were seized from the enemy: 37 2-inch mortars, 8 3-inch mortars, 32 mortars with folding stock, 2 120-mm mortars, 14 90-mm bazookas, 1 57-mm recoilless fieldgun, 6 75-mm recoilless fieldguns and 2 76-mm field guns. A total of 1.2 million rounds of ammunition, including hand grenades, mines, artillery shells and bullets, 4 walkie-talkies, 20 telegraphic sets, and a large quantity of other military supplies. Three armored vehicles, 64 military vehicles and 21 bridges of the enemy were destroyed. [Text] [BK261247 (Clandestine) Voice of the People of Burma in Burmese to Burma 0030 GMT 26 Sep 80]

CSO: 4212

MORE TROOPS RUSHED TO ORISSA

Karachi DAWN in English 7 Oct 80 p 1

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Oct. 6: More troops were rushed to India's south-eastern state of Orissa Sunday rioting local youths continued to loot and burn the houses of Marwari settlers in some areas, the United News of India reported.

Two people have been killed and hundreds injured since violence erupted late last month when some Marwaris—a predominantly trading community from north-western India—refused to donate to local students for flood relief in stricken parts of the state. Rioting and arson spread to several districts in Orissa and student agitators vowed to drive out all Marwaris from the state.

UNI reported that hundreds of troops and armed policemen arrived Sunday in Sambalpur city, 450 kilometers south-west of Cal-

cutta, after local youths called for a one-day general strike Monday in support of their expulsion drive.

Authorities ordered the closure of schools and colleges in Rourkela, Bolangir, Kalahandi, Sundergarh and Sambalpur districts in an attempt to stop student rioting, UNI reported.

Meanwhile, thousands of Marwaris were reported fleeing the violence-racked areas and moving to safer parts of Orissa with their belongings, UNI said.

Last week authorities issued shoot-to-kill orders and clamped curfew on three more towns. Orissa chief minister J. B. Patnaik criticized the movement to compel the Marwari community to quit the state and said hundreds of Marwari houses were looted and set on fire.—APA.

CSO: 4220

LEGISLATOR OPPOSES TRANSFER OF F-16'S TO ISRAEL, TIES WITH PRC

Political Reasons for Transfer

Jakarta MERDEKA in Indonesian 5 Jul 80 p 1

[Text] Amin Iskandar, a member of Parliament from the Development Association faction, strongly criticized the American transfer of F-16 fighters to Israel under the pretext of strengthening Israeli defenses and countering Russian strength in the Middle East.

"Although the transfer of the F-16 fighters to Israel was said to improve Israeli defenses and counter Soviet strength, actually, that did not enter their minds," Amin Iskandar, a member of Commission I (Defense and Security; Foreign Affairs), told the press in the Parliament Building, Senayan, Jakarta on Friday.

He said that the accelerated transfer of the 75 F-16's to Israel around September 1980 was only done to serve the interests of Carter in winning Jewish votes in the presidential election.

Actually, it is not the Soviet Union but the Arab states that confront Israel, because the Arab states have a strategic position and are a source of oil.

Increased Israeli strength will be used to improve its position in the region, which it had stolen by means of military force in the past; to maintain occupation of Jerusalem, which will be established as Israel's permanent capital; to maintain Jewish occupation of the West Bank of Jordan; and to invade Lebanon, Amin Iskandar noted.

"What draws our attention is that the United States, while stubbornly citing international law in the case of the hostages in Iran, ignores international law concerning the occupation of Jerusalem, which is also a holy city for Islam, where the Al Aqsa mosque is located."

Greater Opportunity for Subversion

Jakarta PELITA in Indonesian 12 Jul 80 pp 1, 8

[Excerpts] Member of Parliament H. M. Amin Iskandar said that the restoration of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the PRC would afford the PRC greater opportunity for subversive activity in Indonesia, such as occurred in connection with the 30 September Movement/PKI affair.

"I disagree with those who do not believe that the opening of a PRC embassy would increase subversion and infiltration," said the Commission I member.

He said this in reply to the statement of Dr Juwono Sudarsono, a political affairs specialist at the University of Indonesia. Sudarsono delivered the statement before a discussion forum of University of Indonesia students last Tuesday, saying he did not agree with those who suggested the opening of a PRC embassy would increase subversion and infiltration via their traders in Glodok.

The creation of a PRC representation in Indonesia would make it more difficult to deal with illegal activity, since illegal activity can be concealed by legal activity, he explained.

He hopes that we always remember how the PRC inserted arms into Indonesia via legal diplomatic channels, said the former ambassador to Iraq.

9197

CSO: 4213

INDONESIA

IRAQI PURCHASE OF INDONESIAN HELICOPTERS DISCUSSED

Jakarta SINAR HARAPAN in Indonesian 15 Aug 80 pp 1, 12

[Article: "Sale of Former Nurtanio Helicopters to Iraq not yet Finalized"]

[Excerpts] It is uncertain whether an Iraqi trade delegation which arrived in Jakarta Friday afternoon will discuss the purchase of a number of Nurtanio BO-105 helicopters in its talks with the government of Indonesia.

"The purchase of helicopters for the Iraqi Armed Forces is a matter out of the hands of both the governments of Iraq and Indonesia. It depends on the French Government," said the head of public information of the Department of Trade, Dr Syukri Alimudin, in his response to questions by SINAR HARAPAN at his office on Friday afternoon.

Syukri stated that the Iraqi Government, which is making an effort to build up its armed forces, expressed great interest in buying a number of Nurtanio helicopters which would later be modified to accept an air-borne anti-tank weapons system.

To convert these helicopters into an airborne anti-tank weapons platform, they should be equipped with the Hot (anti-tank) missile installed on the sides of the aircraft.

This missile which is totally compatible with the entire weapons system is manufactured exclusively by France.

According to available information, France objects to the sale of this missile to Iraq unless it is part of a package deal which includes French-manufactured helicopters. In this case, Iraq wishes to purchase the helicopters from Indonesia and the missiles from France.

"Therefore, the problem with this aircraft deal depends on whether France is prepared to give in a little and sell only the missiles," said Syukri Alimudin.

In an effort to bring the aircraft deal to a successful conclusion, a number of approaches have been made to the French Government.

France is noted as an industrialized nation which has a relatively large investment in Iran [sic]. "If the French give in on the sale of the missiles, their business with Iraq will not be hurt very much, and at the same time, the decision will be seen as a measure to help a developing country," said an observer in Jakarta.

Commercial relations between Indonesia and Iraq have not developed at the present time where they can be viewed with alacrity. As a result of the visit by an Iraqi delegation at the beginning of last year, however, agreement was reached on sending a number of Indonesian technical personnel to that Middle Eastern country.

The former minister of information and Indonesian ambassador to the United Nations, Dr Ruslan Abdulgani, visited Iraq for informal discussions a while ago in an effort to promote commercial relations between the two countries. Minister of Information Ali Murtopo also visited Iraq to pursue similar possibilities.

The minister of public works, Purnomosidi Hadjisarosa, and the chairman of the coordinating team for Indonesian exports to the Middle East, Dr Zainul Yasmi, will visit Iraq at the end of August to discuss the possibility of participation by Indonesian contractors in the development that is underway in that Middle Eastern country.

9464
CSO: 4213

GENERAL JASIN QUESTIONED BY JAKARTA PROSECUTOR

Defamation of President

Jakarta PELITA in Indonesian 2 Jul 80 pp 1, 2

[Excerpts] Lieutenant General (Ret.) M. Jasin was questioned Wednesday by the State Prosecutor for South Jakarta.

The State Prosecutor, Rustam Effendy Rasjid, said Wednesday that the questioning was in connection with the dissemination of letters written by M. Jasin containing slander against the president.

Rasjid was not prepared to reveal the type of letters written by General Jasin, which were said to contain insults against the president.

He indicated that the investigation was not yet over, and a second interrogation would be held at a time to be decided.

It was explained that Jasin was accused of violating Articles 134-137 of the penal code, which carry a maximum sentence of 5 years in prison. The articles read, dissemination of material containing elements slandering the chief of state.

Jasin Interrogated Second Time

Jakarta PELITA in Indonesian 15 Jul 80 p 1

[Excerpts] A team from the State Prosecutor's Office of South Jakarta questioned Lieutenant General (Ret.) M. Jasin on Monday.

Unlike the first interrogation, M. Jasin was accompanied by legal counsel, Drs Soedjono.

Last week, it was learned that M. Jasin would be accompanied by a team of legal advisors, including Adnan Buyung Nasution, Harjono Tjitrosubono and Soekardjo, but the three advocates did not attend the interrogation.

Soekardjo told ANTARA on Monday that they had originally planned to accompany M. Jasin, but after consulting with those involved, they decided it was not necessary.

Questioning Sympathetic, Correct

Jakarta SINAR HARAPAN in Indonesian 16 Jul 80 pp 1, 12

[Excerpts] On Wednesday morning, the state prosecutor for South Jakarta continued his questioning of Jasin.

A team picked by the chief prosecutor had questioned him on 2 and 14 July.

Drs Soedjono is acting as Jasin's legal advisor. Replying to a SINAR HARAPAN query on Wednesday morning, Soedjono said the investigation of his client was "very courteous and most sympathetic, but correct."

Drs Soedjono, a graduate of the Social Politics School of the University of Gajah Mada said that he did not directly accompany his client, but was in a room not far from the interrogation room. When Jasin needed advice, for example, when he had difficulty with an incriminating or leading question, he was able to seek permission to talk to his legal advisor.

According to Soedjono, he believes this method was good, because he appreciates the difficulties encountered in an investigation if the lawyer directly accompanies the client.

Witnesses To Be Called

Jakarta PELITA in Indonesian 22 Jul 80 pp 1, 7

[Excerpts] On Monday, a team from the State Prosecutor's Office for South Jakarta continued to question Lieutenant General (Ret.) M. Jasin.

Chief Prosecutor Rustam Effendy Rasjid told ANTARA Monday that the investigation still centered on Jasin, but he said witnesses would be called before long.

Rasjid would still not reveal the type of letter written by Jasin, although the retired officer has been questioned four times.

He would not reveal the names of prospective witnesses. If necessary, Pak Harto would be asked for information, since the case involves him, but there are no plans for such action, at present.

Responding to a question, Rasjid explained that M. Jasin had not been physically accompanied by counsel, but was permitted to consult with his lawyer when he had difficulty in answering a question. The arrangement has been in effect for all four interrogations.

Rajid noted that according to law, a suspect can meet with his legal advisor only in court, or at his place of detention after preliminary investigation has been completed.

Former Health Minister Testifies

JAKARTA KOMPAS in Indonesian 30 Jul 80 p 3

[Excerpts] Dr Aziz Saleh, former minister of health, and a prominent figure in the Boy Scout movement, yesterday announced a summons from the state prosecutor for South Jakarta. He was questioned about the Jasin case.

Chief Prosecutor Rajid said that the questioning of M. Jasin is complete, for now. The investigation will continue with testimony from witnesses. He did not say how many witnesses would be called in connection with the case. He denied reports that six witnesses would be heard, but indicated there would be definitely more than one.

Rajid would not reveal the "time," "place" and "nature" of the slander of which M. Jasin is accused.

9197
CSO: 5213

MISSIONS, FUNCTIONS OF INTEGRATED AIR STRIKE COMMAND

Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 29 Jul 80 pp 1, 3

[Excerpts] The Integrated Air Strike Command (Kopatdara), subordinate to the Indonesian Air Force, is capable of rapid movement because it has aircraft. It is also able to threaten enemy positions because it is air capable. The command has developed two kinds of functions, namely, combat operations in wartime and civil service in peacetime, particularly during the present era of development.

Kopatdara and its aircraft play an important role in every military operation. The command is divided into several subordinate units.

Vice Air Marshal Aried Rijadi, the commander of Kopatdara, said that the command includes Air Transport Operations Wing 001, based at Halim Perdanakusumah Airbase, with the 2nd Squadron, of C-47's and F-27's; the 17th Squadron, composed of C-47's, F-27's, Cessna 401's and 402's, Jet Stars, Cessna-212's, and Skyvan SC-7's; the 31st Squadron with Hercules C-130B's; and Technical Squadron 021, charged with maintaining all aircraft in the air squadrons except for the 31st Squadron's C-130B's.

Tactical Operations Wing 002, based at Abdulrahman Saleh Airbase, has the 1st Squadron with B-26's, which will be replaced by A-4 Skyhawks; the 3rd Squadron with OV-10 Broncos; the 5th Squadron with UF-1's and UF-2's; and Technical Squadron 022, to maintain the wing's aircraft.

Helicopter Operations Wing 004, at Atang Sedjaja Airbase, Bogor, has the 6th Squadron, composed of UH-34's and Pumas; the 7th Squadron, with Bell-204's, S-61's, and Bell-47's; and Technical Squadron 024, for maintenance.

The 1st Special Troops Battalion includes a combat control team, a base security team, and a combat unit, all under operational control of Kopatdara.

"My responsibility as commander of Kopatdara is to build up the command by adding materiel, aircraft, crews, technicians, and troops. Kopatdara is striving for a posture of constant readiness for when it is needed by

"the Ministry of Defense and Security/Armed Forces in an operational situation," said Arifd Rijadi.

"Normally, we respond to requests from the Defense Territorial Commands of the National Strategic Command for a military operation. But we respond to requests from the Department of Defense and Security, or on our own initiative, to perform civil service operations in the event of a natural disaster," Arifd Rijadi replied to a question.

"For example, last year, Defense Territorial Command IV carried out a military operation in the Irian Jaya-Papua New Guinea border area. Kopatdara units were asked to transport and supply troops. In that operation, we flew Defense Territorial Command forces to their operational areas, dropped supplies and carried out air attacks against the rebels," Arifd Rijadi explained.

"During military operations in East Timor, we responded to requests from the Department of Defense and Security Regional Command for East Timor. In short, it can be said that Kopatdara responds to requests from Department of Defense and Security commands engaged in military operations. After the operation is over, my troops return to their headquarters, to be ready for further borrowing by those who need them."

"During Operation Halinter in Defense Territorial Command I, aimed at capturing/eradicating smugglers and controlling the flow of Vietnamese refugees entering Indonesian waters, the National Strategic Command asked Kopatdara to take part. Because Kopatdara was responsible for reconnaissance, and bombing, if needed, we prepared the aircraft needed, namely, Albatross' and OV-10 Broncos. Under the command of the National Strategic Command, we joined naval units in operations in the Natuna Sea and surrounding areas. We responded to Operation Guruh, aimed at catching illegal fishermen, by returning our Albatross' and OV-10's to action. For operations in the Irian Jaya-Papua New Guinea border area, we provided aircraft in keeping with operational needs, such as Hercules', P-27's, Puma and Bell helicopters, and OV-10 Broncos for air attacks," the commander noted.

He said that in addition to military operations, Kopatdara is active in human service operations to aid in development.

"Usually, I receive orders from the Department of Defense and Security. For example, when the president wishes to send livestock to various areas of Indonesia. Kopatdara once transported 200 head of sheep to Wamena, Irian Jaya and cattle to Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and other areas. Besides that, Kopatdara transported housing materials to East Timor and Wamena, and later transported teachers and doctors to those areas. Kopatdara also transports money from area to area, and, during general elections, Kopatdara aircraft transport ballot boxes and voting forms to remote areas."

According to Aried Bijadi, when Kopatdara learns of a natural disaster, it will, on its own initiative, send aircraft and troops to help. For example, in the Merapi disaster in West Sumatra and the tidal wave in Tarantuka, members of Kopatdara were the first to arrive to give help.

"The recent Garuda strike is still fresh in our minds. Kopatdara stepped forward to replace Garuda in transporting passengers, and restored severed communications with outlying areas."

Responding to a question as to whether present armament was sufficient to carry out the task of protecting Indonesian skies, Vice Marshal Aried Bijadi said that he feels it is still insufficient.

"However, the minister of defense and security is considering that shortage, and capability will be augmented, as financial capabilities permit. But with the addition of a 16-plane fighter squadron of F-5E Tigers, we have more trust in our capability. In the future, we definitely expect to add more aircraft of the same type," Aried noted.

The always-candid Aried said there is one primary duty of Kopatdara that fills him with pride and emotion: "Kopatdara aircraft, for example, Hercules' from the 31st Squadron, often transport groups of VIP's, including the president, the minister of defense and security, the army chief of staff, the chief of the Indonesian police and other key armed forces personnel. For example, there was a recent Hercules flight containing only passengers who were one to four-star generals, including the minister of defense and security, the army chief of staff and the chief of police. Imagine the burden of responsibility I carried; of course, I was not the pilot of the aircraft, but as the commander, I bear all responsibility and risk. But thank God, this responsibility has always gone well," he said.

"Kopatdara has special aircraft for that duty," he responded to a question. "They are specially built. I always inspect them before and after those flights. Before the flight, I ask the pilot if there are problems at home; are his wife and children well; is anything lacking at home, etc. If all is well, I approve the flight," Aried explained.

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CSO: 4213

PUBLIC OPINION POLL CONDUCTED

Jakarta TEMPO in Indonesian No 25, 16 Aug 80 pp 8-12

[Article: "Voices Reaching out on the 35th Anniversary"]

[Excerpts] To celebrate the 35th anniversary of the proclamation of independence, we of TEMPO magazine conducted a public opinion poll for the second time in recent years. Using this poll, we sought to determine the views of the people concerning various problems, especially on our results as a nation in fulfilling our independence.

The area in which the poll was conducted comprised almost all of Indonesia except Irian Jaya and northern Sulawesi. In these two areas, because of communication difficulties, the results did not arrive in time for tabulation. However, for the remainder, the results were gratifying. Of the 517 questionnaires that were distributed, 495 were returned, giving a 95 percent rate of return.

However, not all strata of society could be reached, especially the lowest stratum residing in the rural areas. The respondents who answered the poll came from various occupational fields: civil servants, farmers, retired persons, high-ranking officials, students and homemakers as well as parliamentary members. Their educational attainment was at least junior high school level.

About 25 percent of the respondents were women. The age of all participants ranged from 16 to 73 years old. A comparison of all respondents indicated that 64 percent were between 15 and 30 years of age; only 1 percent was above 60 years old. These percentages revealed an average age of 22.5 years for all participants.

The unequal ratio of younger individuals under 30 over older people was deliberate, in order to determine the views of the generation which did not experience the era of foreign colonization. Another factor which accounted for the unequal ratio was the greater proportion of younger people in the population as a whole.

Admittedly the views of 495 individuals hardly represent the opinions of the 145 million people of Indonesia--although the number of respondents is more or less the same as the number of parliamentary delegates who comprise 460 individuals. However, at least we made an effort to record the tremors coming from the lower classes.

The results of TEMPO's public opinion poll are as follows:

Sector showing the most advancement:

Economy	21.65%
Education	20.07%
Politics	19.68%
Religion	15.94%
Corruption	1.77%

Sector showing the least advancement:

Politics	24.54%
Economy	21.45%
Athletics	17.81%
Education	16.54%
Religion	7.81%

The question was posed, "In what area should the principal attention be paid so that the fruition of our independence can continue to be carried forward?" The answers were as follows:

A "clean" government	36.80%
Economic improvement	26.39%
Maintenance of justice	10.40%
Education	8.09%
Political activities	7.32%
Solidarity/social justice	4.23%

It is evident most people considered clean government the most important area to which attention should be paid. This view was reinforced by the response to the following question, "What danger should be most sincerely considered as threatening our independence?" The choice of the respondents was as follows:

Corruption & abuse of authority	43.8%
Reemergence of the PKI	21.6%
Popular indifference	20.2%
Dissension & usurpation of power	12.2%
Separatist sentiments	.8%
Resurgence of DI/TII (militant Islamic movements)	.4%

From the above responses, it is evident that the fear of a resurgent PKI is diminishing. Corruption was considered a greater source of apprehension and was selected as the number one danger.

Does this mean that the people no longer consider communism a danger?

This does not appear to be the case. This is reflected in the respondents' answer to the possibility of danger from external sources:

Communism	63.69%
Western cultural influence	16.92%
Capitalism	12.69%
Radical Islam	5.56%

Note: Although it is not recorded above, three respondents considered Zionism a dangerous external threat. What is interesting is that the respondents who considered western cultural influence a threat generally were urban residents of such cities as Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung and Yogyakarta. In Aceh, 9 out of 10 respondents considered communism as the main threat.

In accordance with the view that external communism constituted a danger threatening Indonesia, the respondents considered communist nations as the chief source of this threat:

China (Beijing)	27.97%
Soviet Union	22.93%
Vietnam	20.96%
United States	11.42%
Japan	8.19%
Australia	3.86%
Iran	3.38%

Several of the respondents indicated "odd" choices which they wrote in themselves. For example, they indicated as a threat to us the nations of East and West Germany--and even Uganda. And what about the Netherlands? Our old colonizing power even got three votes.

What about the economic situation of the respondents' households? TEMPO tried to ascertain their economic prosperity in contrast to that in previous years. The results were as follows:

Compared with 1 year ago

No change	49.29%
Better	31.92%
Worse	18.77%

Compared with 5 years ago

Better	55.85%
No change	31.38%
Worse	12.76%

Compared with 10 years ago

Better	67.11%
No change	20.44%
Worse	12.44%

Compared with 15 years ago

Better	71.78%
No change	15.36%
Worse	12.84%

It can be concluded from the above that the personal economic situation of the respondents generally has been more favorable in the last 15 years. However, the upward curve seems to have flattened out during the last year. This was perhaps influenced by several factors, for example, the rise in price for the last few months--until Lebaran--may have had an effect on the respondents' views.

What is interesting is that although personal economic situations demonstrated improvement the respondents did not view the future with any alacrity. Quite a few also admitted candidly they did not know what the future held in store. These different views were as follows:

Future of the Indonesian economy

Unclear & worrisome	30.17%
No opinion	29.52%
Bright & healthy	26.93%
No change	13.36%

Since the door to foreign investment in Indonesia was opened in 1967, the positive and negative effects of such investment has been under constant scrutiny. What about the views of the respondents?

Helps the progress of the Indonesia economy: yes--45.85%, no--34.56%, no opinion--19.58%.

Constitutes a disincentive to domestic enterprise: yes--50.08%, no--35.01%, no opinion--14.18%.

Increases employment opportunities: yes--63.9%, no--25.33%, no opinion--10.76%.

Expands the base of the economy: yes--59.46%, no--26.28%, no opinion--14.25%.

Imparts occupational skills: yes--50.34%, no--31.97%, no opinion--17.68%.

Stimulates consumerism: yes--63.81%, no--21.92%, no opinion--14.25%.

When the above figures are compared, it is evident that there are ambivalent feelings concerning foreign investment. Nevertheless, negative views tend to be somewhat more prevalent. Foreign investment appears to project its most favorable image in the extension of employment opportunities.

The respondents were not impressed with the performance and achievements of the state enterprises until now. This can be concluded from their answers.

(State enterprises) are harmful and have become hotbeds of chicanery--43.53%.

(State enterprises) are beneficial and profit society--32.85%.

(State enterprises) exert no influence whatever--14.98%.

No opinion--8.62%.

While the image of state enterprises was not favorable to a great number of respondents, participants did not express the desire that all businesses considered vital be returned to the private sector. For example, they expressed the following views:

Businesses that are better managed by the government:

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Aviation	61.23%	38.77%
Railroads	75.38%	24.62%
Telecommunications	86.62%	13.38%
Shipping/Navigation	45.55%	54.45%
Television	51.72%	48.28%
Electricity	78.50%	21.50%
Basic Commodities	81.84%	18.16%

Of the 495 respondents, only 1 person considered that the Indonesian press was excessively free-wheeling and daring. The remainder, 53.83 percent, considered the press responsible in the application of its freedom. A smaller, but still substantial number, 35.19 percent, considered that the press was intimidated and frequently concealed the facts.

Concerning foreign personalities, the late Mahatma Gandhi was the most admired figure (19%).

The president of the United States, who was murdered in 1963, the late John F. Kennedy, took second place (16.4%), although at present he is seldom mentioned in the popular media. After Kennedy came Anwar Sadat (12.1%). Khomeini, who has figured prominently in the news, got 11.7 percent and the former president of Yugoslavia, J. B. Tito, got 11.4 percent.

An interesting response was that the Iranian leader, Khomeini, was the foreign figure most admired in East Java (38%), but received not a single vote in Aceh. What was also interesting was that in West Kalimantan, Anwar Sadat was selected as the most respected foreign leader (58%). The reason, according to one of his admirers, was because Sadat "was morally courageous and swam against the tide. He received the former Shah of Iran and admitted his friendship for him, when the Shah was refused shelter everywhere else."

Our final remark concerns the place of religion in daily life. During the last few years, it has been evident that religion plays a growing role in everyday life in Indonesia. Over 15 percent of the respondents mentioned religion as the sector that showed the most progress in the 35 years since independence.

How about the leading of a religiously oriented life in our society? Is religious worship carried on with regularity? Answers given by the participants indicate that it is. Fifty-four percent indicated they worshipped actively and regularly, 42.6 percent said they worshipped with regularity. Only 3.4 percent indicated they were not religiously active.

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What about press reporting? The majority of the respondents considered political, economic and sports reporting adequately covered. What the participants considered excessive was crime reporting (45.85%). What they thought lacking was reporting on law and legal cases (61.11%).

It appears that a formal education is losing its prestige value among the respondents. It was believed by 76.66 percent that a school education could not guarantee the future for their children. In that case, what could assure a person's future? The participant's choice was as follows:

A sense of determination	70.05%
Fate/destiny	17.76%
Position of parents	7.58%
Wealth of parents	4.59%

There is still a common view that to become a government employee is the principal desire of young people at the present time. The results of the TEMPO poll indicated the contrary, that the respondents had a greater desire for themselves or their children to become merchants or businessmen (41.68%). Nevertheless, the number (31.68%) which aspired to be civil servants was still substantial.

Working for a foreign firm evidently did not attract a great deal of interest. Only 5.55 percent indicated a desire to do so--compared to 12.55 percent who wanted to work for a domestic private enterprise. Did any want to become farmers? Only 5.76 percent. Fishermen only attracted 0.6 percent--even though we have a wide expanse of ocean at our disposal.

In selecting a desired type of profession, that of physician lost out in popularity to that of economist, while the position of school teacher still attracted a good number of people:

Economist	19.40%
Engineer	17.36%
Physician	15.26%
Teacher	13.93%
Journalist	7.82%
Armed Forces	6.48%

Who is the most admired figure of Indonesian history? Sukarno (Bung Kurni) was clearly the respondents' first choice (31.1%). Mohammed Hatta (Bung Hatta) was selected by 19 percent and took second place. General Soedirman occupied third place (12%), followed by Raden A. Kartini (Ibu Kartini) (8.6%).

Except for West Sumatra, the deceased Bung Kurni was the most popular historical figure reported from all regions. The respondents in West Sumatra opted for their own favorite son: in this region, Bung Hatta got 42.85 percent and Bung Kurni 17.48 percent.

ALI MURTOPO COMMENTS ON GROUP OF 50

Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 9 Jul 80 pp 1, 8

[Excerpts] Finance Minister Ali Murtopo believes that the question of succession (replacing the chief of state) should be addressed via constitutional means, that is, it should be decided by the People's Deliberative Congress (MPR).

The minister explained this yesterday in Jalan Cendana, after reporting progress in several areas.

Ali stressed, "Presidential succession must adhere firmly to procedures established in the Constitution of 1945."

"Only conflict or civil war will result if Pak Harto is pressed into retiring from office," he noted, in a statement explaining the Group of 50. According to Ali, the group is urging President Soeharto to retire.

The minister addressed the question of the Group's petition, saying, "I know you want to ask about the Group of 50's petition, but are reluctant. Thus, it is best if I talk about it."

According to Ali Murtopo, General Soeharto is chief of state and head of the government by choice of the MPR. "Pak Harto holds office by mandate of the MPR, not by his own wishes," Ali noted; he is supported fully by functional groups and political parties.

"Although there are those who urge Pak Harto to retire from office, there are many who support him. At the least, he has the support of those who chose him as president. The supporters of Pak Harto are clearly not few in number."

Moreover, because of Pak Harto's great service to Indonesia, far more people support him than wish him to retire. "Yet if both groups--those happy with Pak Harto and those displeased with him--are allowed to clash, it will definitely end in civil war. We don't want that," said the minister.

Thus, replacement of the president must await the general session of the MPR. It should be remembered that there will be a general session of the MPR only if the government and Parliament agree.

Ali noted that the Group of 50 had made erroneous assumptions, and had thus drawn erroneous conclusions.

The minister was referring to assumptions made concerning the president's speech before the Armed Forces in Pekanbaru last March. The speech asked the Armed Forces to be alert to efforts to undermine the Constitution of 1945 and Pancasila.

In replying to the president's speech, the Group of 50 gave the impression that the Armed Forces supports Golkar without reservation. "That impression is false," said Ali Murtopo.

The Armed Forces must be above groups. It must follow the rules established in the Seven Pledges and the Soldier's Oath.

"Every member of the Armed Forces must follow the Seven Pledges and the Soldier's Oath," said Ali. The Armed Forces must protect Indonesia, and must sacrifice themselves for Pancasila.

"A group that undermines Pancasila will definitely not draw Armed Forces support," he emphasized.

From this aspect, the Group of 50 who signed the petition does not agree that the Armed Forces only support Pancasila. They do not agree that the Armed Forces should be among functional groups in the general election.

"Must the Armed Forces be divided?" asked the minister. "Part as a functional group, part in the Indonesian Democratic Party, part in the United Development Party, part supporting the petition of the Group of 50, and other parts supporting other groups?"

"This would split the Armed Forces. Past experience shows that civil war threatens if the Armed Forces are not united," Ali stressed. This disunity can be used by outsiders to incite uprisings, as in the past.

"We must not repeat past experience," said Ali.

Ali believes the Group of 50 does not agree that the Armed Forces supports Golkar. Golkar should confront the Group of 50, to explain that their views are incorrect.

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MINISTER OF MINING AND ENERGY REPORTS ON OIL, NATURAL GAS PROJECTS

Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 22 Jul 80 p 3

[Excerpts] Minister of Mining and Energy Prof Subroto reported to the president in the Bina Graha Monday, on progress in oil and natural gas projects.

After meeting with the president, Subroto told the press that he reported on a hydrocracker project, expansion of the Cilacap and Balikpapan oil refineries, the Aromatic Center Project, the Olivine Project, a methanol project and the expansion of the liquid natural gas plants in Arun and Bontang.

The minister said plans for the hydrocracker project, which will process 45,000 low sulfur waxy residue (sic) into fuel oil are being prepared, and an agreement to form a joint enterprise is under study. Technical work for these preparations is 70 percent complete.

Expansion of the Cilacap Refinery is proceeding according to plan, especially concerning approval given to the American firm, UOP. "The same is true for the progress of the agreement for expanding Balikpapan Refinery," Subroto noted.

In addition, an agreement with Shell for processing lubricating oil in Cilacap has also been signed.

A construction contract for expansion of the Cilacap Oil Refinery is under preparation with the American firm, Fluor.

The contract for expanding the Balikpapan Refinery will be signed with Bechel (sic).

Subroto also told the president about the Aromatic Center Project to be built in Plaju, South Sumatra. This project will produce benzine and paraxylene that will produce manmade fibers for the textile industry.

It is expected that discussions to choose the firm for the project from bids already submitted will begin in August.

"Of the 11 firms which have entered bids, including those from the United States, West Germany and Japan, we will select the most favorable," said Subroto.

Discussions on the Olivine Project in Lhok Suemawe have begun with integrated French, Dutch and American firms.

Discussions will be completed this year, and selection of the contractor will take place in 1981.

The Olivine Project will process natural gas into ethane and ethylene which will be used to make polyethylene, the basic material for industrial plastics.

The methanol project in Pulau Bunyu, East Kalimantan will use natural gas to produce methanol, the prime ingredient in paint.

According to Subroto, expansion of the Cilacap and Balikpapan Refineries is designed to meet domestic fuel oil needs, so that imports can be reduced.

The Liquid Natural Gas plant in Arun will be expanded by 2 trains, an increase in capacity of 3 million tons per year, raising Arun's capacity to 7.5 million tons per year.

The Bontang Liquid Natural Gas Plant in East Kalimantan will be expanded by 2 trains, increasing capacity to 4 trains, each capable of producing 1.5 million tons per year.

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BRIEFS

INDONESIA DENIES REFUSING FOOD--Indonesia has denied reports from official Australian sources in Canberra which allege the Indonesian Government has refused to accept 30 tons of food earmarked for the people of East Timor via the International Red Cross. A government source in Jakarta said Indonesia had not refused emergency food aid from Australia, as had been alleged by a foreign news service in Canberra early this week. The West German News Office, DPA, reported on 30 June, quoting an official Australian source, that Indonesia had refused a shipment of 30 tons of high-protein biscuits that were to be transported to East Timor in an Australian Air Force aircraft. The Indonesian Government source said the shipment had not taken place because formal procedures to land in East Timor had not been completed. The source noted that Australia had canceled the shipment, not Indonesia, because the aircraft scheduled to transport the food was to be used for other purposes on the agreed-upon date. The source also denied reports from Canberra suggesting the cancellation of the food shipment was due to turmoil in Dili. The source told ANTARA that such reports were totally false, and were intended to discredit Indonesia in the eyes of the world. [Text] [Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 4 Jul 80 pp 1, 7] 9197

FIVE NEW AIRFIELDS IN MALUKU--Five pioneer airfields under construction with 428 million Rupiahs in APBD Maluku funds are now almost completed. The five airfields under construction by the Maluku regional government are in Labuha (Bacan), Sanana (North Maluku), Banda (Central Maluku), and Dobo and Saumlaki (Southeast Maluku). Soeyatno, chief of the Subdistrict Construction Service of the Maluku Department of Public Works, is serving as project head for pioneer airfields. He said in Ambon on Monday that the airfields are intended to accelerate air communications between the subdistricts and Ambon and regencies, to speed development in those areas. He said the landing strips were 850 meters long and 80 meters wide, except for Banda, which is only 750 meters long. Its location precludes a longer strip, Soeyatno commented. In addition to these five airfields, the Maluku regional government intends to study three additional locations for pioneer airfields this year. The three locations are in Geser and Wahai in Central Maluku, and Weda in North Maluku. [Excerpt] [Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 15 Jul 80 p 3] 9197

ANTI-INDONESIA BIAS IN RADIO AUSTRALIA--Peter Moore, former head of Radio Australia's Indonesian Section, said in Melbourne recently that Radio Australia reports on Indonesia were greatly biased and often untrue. This interview was contained in newspaper correspondent Jennifer Cooke's interview of Peter Moore carried in the 28 June Sydney Herald. Peter Moore added that reports from Indonesia were occasionally altered before being broadcast back to Indonesia. Moore, who supervised the Indonesian Section from 1966 to his retirement in February 1980, explained that biased reporting by Radio Australia was the prime reason that the visa of Warwick Beutler was not extended. According to Moore, Radio Australia was warned several times that Beutler's visa might not be extended. Yet, the matter did not receive proper attention. In the past, Beutler, ABC/Radio Australia correspondent in Jakarta, was forced to leave the country on several occasions because his visa was not extended. Thus, ABC and Radio Australia, representing ABC Foreign Broadcast Service, do not now have a correspondent in Jakarta. [Text] [Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 14 Jul 80 p 1] 9197

FOREIGN MINISTER VISITS CZECHOSLOVAKIA--The Government of Indonesia and the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia consider it vital that world peace and regional harmony continue, in keeping with the United Nations charter that both nations view as the basis for world peace. This was contained in a joint statement issued by Indonesia and Czechoslovakia yesterday, marking the end of Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja's visit to Czechoslovakia, which began on 13 July. The joint statement was released by Foreign Minister Mochtar and Czech Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chroupek in Prague. The two foreign ministers agreed that detente must proceed, and must encompass the entire world. Mochtar and Bohuslav Chroupek stressed the need for progress in disarmament negotiations, during the special United Nations session on disarmament. The two nations agreed to work together actively to develop the international economy and to establish an international development organization based on the principles of freedom and equal rights. In bilateral questions, the two governments agreed to increase trade and engage in technical and cultural exchanges aimed at strengthening ties between them. During his 3-day visit to Czechoslovakia, Mochtar met with President Gustav Husak and Deputy Prime Minister Vaclav Hula. Mochtar is visiting several Eastern European Nations, including Austria and Poland. [Text] [Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 17 Jul 80 pp 1, 7] 9197

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KAMPUCHEA

BACKGROUND REPORTS ON KAMPUCHEAN LEADERS

Pen Sovan, National Defense Minister

East Berlin HORIZONT in German Vol 13 No 36, 1980 signed to press 1 Sep 80
pp 14-15

[Interview with Pen Sovan, deputy chairman, People's Revolutionary Council of the People's Republic of Kampuchea; minister for national defense; commander-in-chief, Revolutionary Armed Forces; by Dieter Wende: "The Minister From the Jungle"]

[Text] "Rebels had a meeting there then," ZUERCHER ZEITUNG was squawking in a 4 December 1978 report from Tokyo, "of which nothing was said as to where exactly it was held and how long it lasted."

"The rebels were we," as Pen Sovan put it bluntly, "and the meeting was held exactly on 2 December 1978, and we founded the National Front for the Salvation of Kampuchea. We had assembled in one of our military bases in the jungle of Kratie Province."

That liberation movements in Asia are founded in the midst of the jungle is nothing unusual. Nor is it unusual that ministers in people's governments, normally appointed during festive sessions in splendid buildings, will assume their office in the midst of the jungle as well. "Our troops had already taken Phnom Penh on 7 January, to be sure, but battles continued. "In the Kratie jungle camp, Kampuchea's new ministers were appointed in the night between 8 and 9 January 1979, and I was among them," Pen Sovan said. "We immediately held our first meeting. Our people's council faced a load of complicated tasks: We had to rescue our people that was bleeding and starving to death. If you always say that you had to start at ground zero in 1945--we were below zero."

Opposite to me there is this slim, almost slight man. Big black eyes, all alive, in his lean face, expressive hands. Western mass media call him mysterious. None of those scribblers are likely ever to have spoken with him. In the hours of our conversation I find him reticent, reserved, and serious--the tragedy of the past and the problems of the present resting

all too heavily on his shoulders. Only in brief moments that cheerfulness breaks through that is a natural endowment of the Southeast Asian peoples, and which I have witnessed there even in dangerous situations. What his laughter then means is: we'll make it.

Right at the start of our conversation I asked Pen Sovan to tell me about his life. I presumed he would make it brief. But what he says is still more sparse than what I had expected, yet it stirs me deeply. All throughout our talk then there is one question I cannot evade: how could this graceful man endure 30 years of battles in the jungle with their inconceivable hardships and years of illegality?

'Important Only Is the Life of My People'

"I was born on 15 April 1936 in the village of Samroang in Takeo Province. My parents were among the poorest peasants. We were seven siblings. In 1950 I took up arms. During my military career I graduated from an officers' school and became first lieutenant and adjutant to a division commander, and later I studied at a Vietnamese military academy. When the United States started its aggression, I resumed my combat duty and worked at the radio station of the national united front. At that time I looked through the Pol Pot and Ieng Sary theories. That is why I departed from the united front in 1973, it being run by that gang, and a group of comrades along with me. But that clique in 1975 stole the victory from our people. We had been recruiting our forces and organizing our struggle between 1973 and 1978. Starting with October 1978, our troops thrust forward. On 2 December that year we founded the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation, and I became its deputy chairman and the commander-in-chief of its armed forces. Within a few days thereafter the murderous regime collapsed because the Kampuchean people rose and Vietnam supported us. Now I devote all my strength to the rebirth of my people and the construction of socialism in Kampuchea. Our next target is a constitution. Special attention is given to strengthening our relations with the socialist countries." The curriculum vitae of a Kampuchean patriot and comrade in terse sentences. Pen Sovan does not want much fuss about his own life. "Important only is the life of my people," he says elsewhere. But how much drama and tragedy, how many battles and victories, are implied by every word of his. Some of his statements I picked up later again during our talk, asking him for explanations and backgrounds. That reveals, through the life of this present-day revolutionary with all its hardship but also with its confidence in victory, the history of Kampuchea and all the complexities in the class conflict of our time.

'Seven Siblings'

A progressive world audience is still aghast at the horrors of the Pol Pot era. Our newspapers' mentioning the number of as many as 3 million murdered almost seems like an escape into statistics. That figure cannot possibly summarize all the suffering in the beastly destruction of so many

lives, so many hopes. And sometime those 3 million even make us forget the 800,000 who died in defense of freedom up to the time that Pol Pot came to power in Kampuchea. Because this is a people that has been fighting for 35 years. When I asked about his siblings, Pen Sovan's eye-lids quivered. And then, time and time again, I would hear that word that makes your blood freeze: *samlap* (killed). "My father was tortured during the Japanese occupation and died from the consequences. My mother was killed in our anti-French resistance. At that time one of my younger siblings also was killed. My older brother commanded an artillery battalion that took part in the liberation of Phnom Penh in 1975. Then the murderers sent him for "retraining" and he was killed. Now, I don't know, but two other siblings also were killed. After the second liberation (January 1979) only three of us were left. All my other relatives--uncles and aunts, nieces and nephews--were killed."

Samlap--the tragedy of a people, summarized in one family.

'In 1959 I Took Up Arms'

Pen Sovan is 14 years old then. "I served with an assault detachment of our strongest division in the south. Those were tough times. Whatever function I served in in the army--as enlisted man, officer or commander-in-chief--, when something was risky, I did it myself. And whomever we were fighting against--the French, the Lon Nol regime, the U.S. imperialists, the Thieu troops or the murderous clique--, I tried to save many people's lives."

Listing all the enemies like this does reveal the martyrdom of the Kampuchean people at once. Since 1863, the country, called Cambodia, had been a French colony. In World War II, the territory was occupied by Japanese troops. When Japan collapsed, Kampuchea was free, and King Sihanouk proclaimed its independence in August 1945. But right then in October, France occupied it again. The National United Front, set up in 1950, rallied the growing resistance of the people. The success of the patriots, young Pen Sovan in their ranks, led to the formation of a national state in 1953, the independence of which France had to accede to in 1954 in a Geneva accord. That state pursued a policy of nonalignment and peaceful coexistence. In 1969, without any declaration of war, U.S. bombers started dropping their deadly cargo on Kampuchea. By expanding its aggression the United States sought to avoid its defeat in South Vietnam. Consequently, on 18 March 1970, there came the U.S.-controlled coup under General Lon Nol, and on 30 April troops of the United States and of its puppet Thieu invaded the country. The people's resistance was organized rapidly within the National United Front, which liberated large parts of the country. At that time Pen Sovan fought within the ranks of the front. Neither U.S. bombing attacks on the liberated zones nor enforced recruitments by Lon Nol could save the regime, the U.S. vassal. On 17 April 1975, the forces of liberation, the Khmer Rouge, entered Phnom Penh, jubilantly welcomed by the people. But then Pen Sovan no longer belonged in its ranks.

'The Clique Stole the Victory'

"In how barbaric a manner my people was cheated out of the fruits of victory is now familiar," Pen Sovan says. "I would like to make some comments on what was behind it. I had much to do between 1970 and 1973 with Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and their cronies. Then I ~~saw~~ through their theories and began to comprehend into what kind of destruction they planned to drag our people. Many other party cadres did too. And when we then had to realize that Ieng Sary had organized the murder of Son Ngoc Minh (chairman of the Revolutionary People's Party) in 1972, we could no longer maintain any combat community with the murderers. Our quitting the front thus was no spontaneous act--actually the conflicts between the Marxist-Leninist forces and the Maoist group had started already in 1960 and intensified afterwards."

How tough and tragic these conflicts were remained hidden for a long time. The Communist Party of Indochina had been founded in 1930. In 1951, its second party congress decided to dissolve it in view of the new conditions for the struggle. Independent communist parties were to be established in the three former countries of the Indochina colony. That gave rise to the Revolutionary People's Party of Kampuchea with Son Ngoc Minh as chairman and Touk Samout as general secretary. It was a Leninist-type party, struggling in deep illegality. Around 1960 young people penetrated the revolutionary movement who had been contaminated in Paris with anarchistic, Trotskyite and Maoist ideas. "They wanted neither communism nor socialism but wanted a Maoist model," says Pen Sovan. "And that is what they brutally did bring about: prior to 1975, through secretly murdering party cadres, after 1975, through a social monster which no longer had classes but 'old people' from the villages and 'new people' from the towns, who mainly were to be destroyed. Socialist democracy was replaced by the anonymous 'Angkor,' the 'organization': It ordered enforced marriages, enforced re-settlement, forced labor and mass murder. Marx had lashed out against that as a 'splendid piece of barracks communism' where all atrocities are glorified as revolutionary virtue and the prison mob rules." That clique had seized power in 1968, and its method became more and more gruesome. Pol Pot also organized the assassination of General Secretary Touk Samout," says Pen Sovan.

'Within a Few Days the Regime Collapsed'

I told Pen Sovan that many had been astonished that the National Front for the Salvation of Kampuchea, founded December 1978, had gained victory, with the aid of the Vietnamese comrades, as early as in January 1979. He smiles with some sadness. "You think we were the first to put up resistance? Kampuchea put up incessant resistance against the clique of murderers. Between February 1977 and May 1978 alone we got reports on six big revolts. They failed because they were isolated. Because that was one of the secrets of the bloody 3 years, 8 months and 20 days under Pol Pot: absolute isolation. No province had contacts with any other. No labor column--and that sometimes included 50,000 people who were forced to build a canal--had any contact with its environment."

I ask the commander-in-chief what had been the most difficult operation he had ever commanded. "All operations were difficult," says Pen Sovan. "We had too few cadres, too few weapons. Our military specialists were inexperienced." Pen Sovan does not want to talk about his personal share in the liberation, but there are eyewitnesses: "Pen worked out our combat strategy and led us," says Keo Chanda, one of the founders of the salvation front, today's minister of culture and information.

'Special Attention to Strengthening Relations'

When Pen Sovan in February this year was in Moscow and Leningrad for the first time, at the Kremlin and Smolny, he made the almost identical point in two different speeches: "I feel deep gratitude for the USSR's fraternal internationalist aid. Nothing can destroy the strengthening of relations between us." He nods his head vigorously when I am quoting that. "In our struggle with the gang of murderers, our most important and complicated task was to take up contact with the socialist countries. With our immediate neighbors Vietnam and Laos we did have close relations." My conversation partner explained to me how difficult it had been under the condition of isolation maintained by Pol Pot to disseminate in foreign countries the truth about the just struggle of Kampuchea's patriots. "Not till after the founding of our front did the program we had issued unmask the gruesome terror of the clique and showed the justice of our struggle through its simple demands for abolishing forced labor, enforced marriage, enforced resettlement, for reconstituting the 8-hour day and so forth," says Pen Sovan. "Immediately after our victory we established contacts with the socialist countries. Strengthening these relations has now become the most important task for Kampuchea's socialist development. That has become a matter of life and death for us."

'All My Strength for Our Rebirth'

Pen Sovan vividly discusses the current situation. "The life of the people is improving every day, for all its strength is devoted to our reconstruction. One cannot yet say that no one starves, yet no one starves to death any longer." He talks about the resumption of production in the textile industry, the pharmaceutical enterprises and the automobile tire plants. The trains are running again. "We are worried about our roads. The United States dropped 100,000 tons of bombs on Kampuchea till 1974. Our bridges were its primary targets. Then the Pol Pot clique blew up more bridges to prevent communication among the provinces." The new Kampuchea started airlines and repaired its ports. "How important it was that we immediately organized a minimum of medical care down to the village-level can be seen by the following facts: some 90 percent of all Kampucheaans suffers from one or several illnesses," says Pen Sovan. Of a total of 500 physicians, 150 druggists and 100 dentists, only 50, 26 and 30 respectively survived the terror. "That is why the medical faculty was the first one at Phnom Penh University to start teaching. It has 800 students. In 1983 we shall have our first new physicians," Pen Sovan says.

Still more difficult things are in agriculture. In 1979, only 40 percent of the expected harvest could be brought in due to both drought and floods. The first economic plan prepared for 1980 had scheduled an expansion of rice cultivation to a 1.5 million-hectare acreage in order to eliminate hunger.

With cautious pride Pen Sovan reports that 900,000 children attend school again today: "Those are all the children in Kampuchea! And that in a country where there were no schools for years. Because only 207 out of 23,000 teachers survived the mass murder, 10,000 rapidly trained new teachers are instructing the children. Our youngest ones are our future. On them all our attention must be concentrated. Over 50 percent of all children in Kampuchea lost either their father or their mother, you see. Some 150,000 are fully orphaned."

'Our Next Goal Is Our Constitution'

Only later on did I dare to ask Pen Sovan about his own family. "I was able to place them safe," he replies briefly. "My wife, my daughters of 15 and 5, and my 12-year old son are living. But if I may mention another figure: some 80 percent of all women in Kampuchea are widows. That figure shows that the terror of the mostly young and mentally backward underlings of the clique was aimed especially against those age-groups that were physically able to put up resistance. It is understandable that the whole country wants to settle accounts with Pol Pot and his crowd. Every one who has suffered is launching accusations before the people's tribunals. Pol Pot and his henchmen are condemned to death. They are outlaws. Anyone who runs into them must execute the sentence. Without hesitation."

It is only at this point of our conversation that Pen Sovan loses some of his self-control. "These criminals have dragged the respect for the party through the mud. We did of course in the jungle preserve our party's Marxist-Leninist character and tried to preserve the people's confidence. But they, abusing the communist name, have murdered and, through their unspeakable terror, discredited the concepts of socialism and communism. Now we seek by all means the trust of the people. Late this year already we shall hold parliamentary elections and vote on our constitution."

A few days after our talk the press reported that the People's Republic had formed a constitutional commission. Chaired by the chairman of the People's Revolutionary Council, Heng Somrin, and by his deputy Pen Sovan, it is going to organize the country-wide discussion of the draft constitution and accept suggestions from the population.

At the end Pen Sovan once more returns to the relations with the socialist countries and their parties. "We think they are very important. We want to develop this cooperation rapidly and are preparing the basis for it. Our country is very rich in natural resources and raw materials: lumber, including mahogany, caoutchouc, black pepper, gold, diamonds, oil off the

coast, which we cannot use as yet. We want to tap these riches jointly. I am sure the cooperation with the GDR will develop at our mutual advantage."

The graceful man, the minister from the jungle, takes leave with a firm handshake. "Your people is generous--I would like to thank for all the help it has given, and is giving, to my people," Pen Sovan says. "I admire the successes your people has achieved under SED leadership."

Meas Samnang, Trade Union Chief

East Berlin HORIZONT in German Vol 13 No 31, 1980 signed to press 28 Jul 80
pp 14-15

[HORIZONT Portrait' feature article by Hans-Peter Schubaerth: "Meas Samnang, chairman, Trade Union Federation for the Salvation of Kampuchea--A Builder of the New Kampuchea"]

[Text] 7 January 1979. Units of the people's liberation forces are marching through the streets of the Kampuchean capital Phnom Penh. The faces of the soldiers and officers reflect the hardships and deprivations the hard struggle against the murderous Pol Pot regime has exacted from them and their Vietnamese class comrades. But their physical exhaustion recedes under the feeling of happiness that prevails everywhere about having regained their freedom.

Amidst the military formations there marches a man in the general's rank of the Kampuchean people's liberation forces. Disconcertedly he glances at the rows of houses in Phnom Penh, once a vital and busy city of millions. All he can see on this 7 January are dilapidated facades, destroyed roads, gas stations with their pumps wrecked, mountains of debris and garbage, and smashed-in windows of what used to be flourishing stores. The officer's name is Meas Samnang. Later he would tell me that to him and to many other comrades, in view of the impressions during the liberation of Phnom Penh, the whole scale of the crimes of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, committed against their own people, came back once again in all their distinctiveness.

The Officer With the Rice Bowl

Meanwhile Meas Samnang has exchanged his uniform for civilian clothes. He is the chairman of the Trade Union Federation for the Salvation of Kampuchea, member of the Central Committee of the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation and minister of industry of the People's Republic of Kampuchea. After cordially saying "hello" to me during his visit in our republic, he starts talking without further ado about the situation in his country, mentioning to begin with the sentiments and ideas he had when he returned to Phnom Penh after 3 1/2 years. What a contrast that made with the day when the Lon Nol regime, vassal to the United States, had been destroyed!

Once before this, on the morning of 17 April 1975, Meas Samnang, amidst victorious troops, had marched up Monivong Road, hemmed by a jubilant crowd. Then that joy was due to the overthrow of the hated and corrupt clique around Lon Nol who had virtually surrendered the country to U.S. imperialism with its economic interests and ambitions of military strategy in the Southeast Asian region. Through the victory of the armed forces of the people, Meas Samnang tells me, and through its sacrificial struggle, all prerequisites had been created for establishing a progressive Kampuchea oriented to socialism.

That was a goal to which Meas Samnang had committed himself when still very young. Born in 1932, he grew up in a poor Kampuchean peasant family. At the early age of 11 years, after the untimely death of his parents, he, as the oldest, headed a nine-member family and had to provide its subsistence. When we are talking about that period, Meas Samnang wants to place no special emphasis on his own fate, which was marked by misery and poverty throughout his childhood. Thousands and thousands of peasants were struggling for their livelihood which was often threatened by poor harvests or floods.

Meas Samnang's further development was marked by his people's anticolonialist struggle. In 1863, on the pretext of having to protect Kampuchea from being seized by its neighbors, France, in the colonial fashion, had set up a protectorate over the country. In 1887, it became a part of the Indochinese Union, i.e. a French colony. While the king was formally retained as the chief-of-state, the power of government, for all intents and purposes, lay in the hands of the French General Gouverneur. Yet just as little as the Vietnamese and the Laotian peoples would the Kampucheans reconcile themselves to foreign rule which forced them under the boot of French colonialism and despoiled the country of its natural resources.

Another impulse for the insurgence of the popular masses against the colonial system came from bourgeois-democratic ideas also reaching Kampuchea around the turn of the century. From the ranks of the gradually evolving national intelligentsia, personalities with humanistic and patriotic persuasion emerged oriented not only to establishing national independence but to modifying the old monarchistic form of government as well.

After the founding of the Communist Party of Indochina in 1930, Marxist-Leninist ideas spread to Kampuchea, and after World War II the people's resistance against foreign rule assumed new dimensions. Meas Samnang too, weapon in hand, took part in the struggle against the French colonial army. There he distinguished himself through special abilities in the strategy and tactics of jungle warfare and gained an officer's rank.

While we were talking, he passed me a snapshot showing him distributing rice among needy peasants in those years. Being known for his organizational talent and his prudence in handing out such foodstuffs, he was known among the peasants as the "officer with the rice bowl."

To coordinate the struggle against the French colonial overlord, the United Liberation Front of the Peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea was formed in March 1951. In 1953 France found itself compelled to grant national independence to Kampuchea, which was internationally ratified by the Geneva foreign ministers conference in 1954. "Our people had gained an important victory," Meas Samnang says in retrospect. "It created the preconditions for years of neutral, anti-imperialist foreign policy, insuring my country of a period of peace, and our working people of a relatively stable standard of living."

Hopes Betrayed

After national independence was achieved, Meas Samnang deepened his knowledge in military theory. He had the opportunity to study Marxist-Leninist doctrine in depth. Since 1970 he was working in the National United Front of Kampuchea which united in its ranks the most diverse patriotic and anti-imperialist forces opposing the Lon Nol dictatorship that had been placed in the saddle after the coup against the Sihanouk government with Washington's energetic support. To support the new regime, the United States and the Thieu clique in Vietnam started open aggression against Kampuchea but were definitively defeated when the people's liberation forces entered Phnom Penh on 17 April 1975.

"Yet the hopes our people placed on Kampuchea's future on account of its victory over U.S. imperialism and our internal reaction were to be betrayed in a terrifying manner in subsequent years," says Meas Samnang with deep personal irritation. "The Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime abused the gullibility and frankness of the Kampuchean people in a downright sadistic manner to implement an 'experiment' the outcome of which left 3 million dead."

Meas Samnang reports about the crimes of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique with tears in his eyes. As many other Kampucheans, he also lost his entire family. After the liberation from the Lon Nol regime, he belonged among the patriotic forces seeking a genuine transformation in the socialist sense. "Soon however," he says with bitterness, "we found ourselves betrayed by the new government and noticed it was engaged in a policy of systematic genocide, murdering our brothers and sisters en masse, even if at the beginning we did not envisage the whole range of these crimes. Killings were kept secret." Meas Samnang discusses the ideological background for the crimes of those who intended, under the banner of progress, to implement in practice the Maoist theory of "collectivist socialism," and he then continues: "This 'collectivist socialism,' pursued under the slogan of 'turning toward autonomy' and 'relying on one's own strength,' had nothing in common with the scientific socialism established by Marx, Engels and Lenin. The general inevitabilities of the socialist revolution were done away with as 'revisionist,' our towns were doomed to perish, money was abolished as legal tender, all trade was suspended. Personal property no longer existed. In this manner, the 'classless society' was to be established. One could continue with these examples of a social conception bordering on insanity. Whoever insinuated any criticism or

actually resisted was murdered. Pol Pot made the fanatical statement: 'Out of 8 million Kampuchea we only need 1 million people loyally devoted to us.' That was his program."

Domestic terror was coupled with aggressive acts, assaults and massacres against the Vietnam neighbor. "From summer 1975 to October 1978, Pol Pot troops crossed the Vietnamese border 6,000 times and committed cruel crimes there. Behind it all was the Peking leadership with its hegemonic goals in Southeast Asia, which Mao Zedong had once explained as follows: 'We absolutely have to have Southeast Asia. That region is very rich, there are many natural resources there. After we have got Southeast Asia, the east wind will overwhelm the west wind.' Kampuchea played an important role in that strategy. That is why China sent enormous quantities of weapons and war equipment. That was the only reason for the 20,000 Chinese 'advisors' in my country. The whole regime was Peking's accomplice."

Involved in the Organization of the Resistance

Mens Samnang was among the patriotic forces that already in 1975 rose up against the government. But because the resistance movement was still split and without unified leadership, it was bloodily suppressed. Mens Samnang, taking part in the struggles, managed to go underground early in 1976. He had a great share in the formation of a national united front. The time was ripe for doing away with the bloody dictatorship. "The people's insurgency spread more and more. This process also was facilitated by that most of the regular army divisions were involved in the aggression against Vietnam and had to sustain painful blows by the SRV people's army in the Vietnamese border area. The high point came with the revolt by the people's masses and the patriotic military units on 26 May 1978 in the eastern region (military district 203), which brought the breakthrough toward unified advances." On 2 December that year, the founding of the National United Front for the Salvation of Kampuchea initiated the final and decisive phase of the revolutionary struggle.

The country faces problems of course that cannot be solved from one day to the next. As Heng Somrin, chairman of the Central Committee of the National United Front for the Salvation of Kampuchea, once has said, Kampuchea virtually had to begin at ground zero. Mens Samnang points out that immense damage was inflicted on the country during the dictatorship of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary in its industry, agriculture, health and education, and all domains of public life.

Machines and tools are lacking and, above all, skilled specialists. The intelligentsia had been liquidated as a social stratum. Merely 27 engineers, 135 technicians and 1,250 specialized workers have survived the massacre. In view of that situation, the first successes in the work of national reconstruction have been all the more impressive: the water and power supply was started again in the towns. Up to the end of 1979--that means within one year--the more than 50 reconditioned factories in the country would, among other things, produce 1.5 million square meters of cotton fabrics, 6,500 fishing nets, 82,500 hoes and shovels, more than half a million tiles, 16,000 bicycle tires, 5,000 cubic meters of oxygen,

and 1,000 cubic meters of acetylene. In agriculture, the first large harvest after the liberation was brought in. It, to be sure, is not yet sufficient for adequately supplying all the people with foodstuffs.

Progress was also made in education. At present the young people's republic has 4,200 schools with 13,000 classrooms. Today, 800,000 children are going to school again. In Phnom Penh alone, 5,000 adults learn to read and write in evening courses.

Trade union development is still in its infancy, Meas Samnang reports, who in 1979 became a member of the Revolutionary People's Council and in the same year also the chairman of the Trade Union Federation for the Salvation of Kampuchea. As an example he refers to the Takh Mau tire factory, built in cooperation with the CSSR and starting its operations in 1972. When in 1975 the whole population was driven into the countryside to perform forced labor there under the worst conditions, some of the workers in that factory were simply interned in the enterprise. A barbed wire fence around the whole premises was symbolic, as it were, of the whole character of that plant: a tire-producing concentration camp. The working crews had no contact at all with the outside all through the Pol Pot period. And terror was on the rampage there too: out of almost 390 workers only 189 survived the rule of terror.

Output is still small today. There is hardly any raw material; there are no spare parts and no specialists. Nonetheless, they are full of confidence in Takh Mau. Right now, the workers together with plant management are in the process of building up a trade union organization. That project is in line with the 11-point program of the National United Front of 2 December 1978, which decided to construct revolutionary mass organizations. That program also forms the basis for creating the Trade Union Federation for the Salvation of Kampuchea. The Bureau and General Council of the WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions) in April 1979 endorsed its membership application.

Meas Samnang points out that the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime, because of its inhuman policy, has inflicted grave ideological damage on the thoughts of people. "The main thing is further to develop the population's confidence in the new government and to reclaim the entire people of Kampuchea for our reconstruction work."

The chairman of the Kampuchean Trade Union Federation omits confidence while saying that. One of his associates who was with him tells me after our conversation that the predominant trait of Meas Samnang is his firm resolution to implement with all rigor any task he has set for himself.

Thanks for Internationalist Solidarity

The chairman is stirred deeply when he is talking of the internationalist solidarity for their national reconstruction by the socialist community of states, principally the Soviet Union and Vietnam. There are specialists, for instance, who are supporting the young people's republic in its

economic development, mainly in the production of foodstuffs and consumer goods and in the development of the public health system. The USSR, for example, supplied last year more than 160,000 tons of foodstuffs, medicines valued at more than R 1 million, trucks, cars and other important goods. Vietnam sent, among other things, large quantities of foodstuffs, seed grain and bicycles. On 12 March this year, the CDR freighter Line-Lotte Herrmann arrived with solidarity commodities from the FDGB and the Ernst Thaelmann pioneer organization valued at M 12 million, including foodstuffs, trucks, medicines and study materials.

Meas Samnang refers to what Heng Somrin said on the occasion of the first anniversary of the country's liberation, on 7 January 1980, in front of what once was the royal palace in Phnom Penh: "On the one hand, we asked the governments and peoples of Vietnam, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to supply us for the time being with foodstuffs, medicines and means of transport. On the other hand, there has been fraternal mutual help extended among our own population so that, in the outcome, our life has stabilized."

Meas Samnang adds this: "We have learned early in the game who our true friends are. Certainly not those who feign compassion with the plight of our fellow-countrymen and tearfully bewail the cruel fate of the Kampuchean people on television screens and in newspaper columns. What those forces actually want is to withhold from our government its legitimacy in terms of international law and--as recent weeks have made completely clear in connection with the refugee problem along the Thai border--revitalize the old regime and send the people's power to hell. Kampuchea seeks all-round good neighborliness and peace to be able to surmount as rapidly as possible the heavy legacy of the 4-year rule of Pol Pot. The CDR here stands in the front rank of those who selflessly and unselfishly are supporting us in this complicated task, and we are grateful for that to the people in your country!"

5885
CSO: 8120

AUGUST BATTLE CASUALTIES REPORTED

BK041050 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 1 Oct 80

[Text] Last August, our army and guerrillas on all battlefields and fronts throughout the country actively implemented the additional directives of our Democratic Kampuchean National Army's and guerrillas' general staff and continued vigorously to attack the Vietnamese enemy aggressors according to the three combat tactics, eroding and destroying many of their troops every day.

As a result, in August our comrades in arms killed or wounded 13,002 enemy troops, including a one-star Vietnamese colonel, a three-star, two-star and one-star lieutenants, 2 regiment commanders, 5 battalion commanders, 4 company commanders, 6 platoon commanders, a major, a captain, a sub-lieutenant, a Vietnamese instructor in Takeo, a Vietnamese commune committee leader, a commune military forces leader, 2 Vietnamese group leaders and 8 white-shirted, big-nosed foreigners; destroyed 50 military barracks and buildings, a depot, 21 trenches, 4 bridges, 35 trucks, a boat, a 105mm cannon, 6 mortars, 11 M-30 and 12.7mm machineguns, 51 B-40 and B-41 guns, 3 drum-magazine guns, 15 M-79's, 135 AK's, 6 AR-15's, a pistol, 4 C-46 and C-25 field radio sets and some other materiel; seized 2 mortars, an M-30 machinegun, 10 B-40's and B-41's, 2 drum-magazine guns, 10 M-79's, 109 AK's, 12 AR-15's, 10 CCK's, 344 mortar shells, 200 rounds of machinegun ammunition, 101 B-40 and B-41 rockets, 67 M-79 grenades, 26 [as printed] 430 rounds and 11 crates of AK ammunition, 61 handgrenades, 794 mines, 328 cans of humanitarian aid food and some other materiel; liberated 2 positions on the Koh Kong-Kompong Som battlefield; wiped out 2 Vietnamese positions on the Kamrieng battlefield of Battambang Province; and completely crushed the operation on the Pradak-Prek Thom battlefield of Phnum Sampeou District, Battambang.

As for the result of the efforts to build the primitive weapon system, it is as follows: our comrades in arms made and planted 30,800,646 punji stakes, dug 39,118 new punji pitfalls, produced 10,069 new automatic bows, set 2,515 new snares, planted 710 mines and felled 11,973 trees to block roads.

OUR COMPANIONS IN ARMS PLEDGE:

1. To continue effectively and ingeniously implementing the three combat tactics;
2. To pay more attention to increasing commando raids, surprise attacks and ambushes against logistics groups in order to erode and destroy as many enemy troops as possible to fulfill and overfulfill monthly targets;
3. To pay more attention to strengthening and expanding primitive weapons networks by making more punji stakes, automatic bows, punji pitfalls, snares, booby traps, mines and roadblocks everywhere;
4. To constantly work well beside the people by joining closely with the masses in productive labor and in hiding produce; and
5. To protect our own forces to the best of our ability and train, build and develop them in all fields to make them grow from all viewpoints--ideological, political, organization and in terms of combat tactics and number.

Long live our valiant Democratic Kampuchean National Army and guerrillas and Kampuchean people!

CSO: 4212

GUERRILLA 9-27 AUGUST ACTIVITIES REPORTED

BK060826 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 3 Oct 80

[Text] Here is a report on the activities of the (Bigiar)-Fulro guerrillas on the (Sala Pao) battlefield: On 9 August the (Bigiar)-Fulro guerrillas attacked the enemy position at (Buon Te Ininh), killing 27 Le Duan troops, wounding 7 others and setting 13 barracks ablaze. They seized 2 machineguns, 15 AR-15's and a quantity of materiel.

On 10 August, they attacked the enemy position at (Kambout), killing 21 Le Duan troops, wounding 11 others, setting fire to 10 barracks. They seized 7 AK's, 3 AR-15's, 2 CKC's, a M-79, 16 handgrenades and a quantity of materiel.

On 15 August, they ambushed a truck convoy of the Le Duan clique on a stretch of Route 20 between (Chreng) and (Sala Pao), setting ablaze 3 trucks, killing 22 Le Duan troops--including a Vietnamese provincial chief--and seizing 13 weapons and a quantity of materiel.

On 16 August, they attacked the Le Duan troops at (Hien Dine), killing 16 and seizing 6 weapons.

On 19 August, they attacked the Le Duan clique at a position in (Trong) hamlet, killing 22 enemy troops, setting 9 barracks on fire and seizing 16 weapons.

On 20 August, they ambushed a truck convoy on a stretch of Route 20 from (Sala Pao) to (Ta An), setting two six-wheeled trucks ablaze, killing two enemy soldiers and seizing five weapons.

On 24 and 27 August, they attacked the Le Duan troops at (Ta Mero) and ambushed them in the vicinity of (Yo Seli), killing 20 enemy troops, setting ablaze 2 barracks and seizing 3 AK's and an M-79.

In sum, during these 8 days, the (Bigiar)-Fulro guerrillas on the (Salo Pao) battlefield killed or wounded 148 Le Duan troops, including a provincial chief, destroyed 5 trucks, set 34 barracks ablaze and seized 74 assorted weapons and a quantity of handgrenades and materiel.

KAMPUCHEA

BRIEFS

VISITS TO VIETNAMESE FORCES--A delegation of the Central Trade Union led by Comrade Meas Samnang paid visits to Vietnamese brothers in early September to mark the 35th anniversary of the SRV independence, at the hospital of the Vietnamese forces and in the VPA 4th Division. [BK191249 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1100 GMT 10 Sep 80]

VPA ASSISTANCE IN PRODUCTION--Besides helping the Kampuchean armed forces to wipe the Pol Pot bandits out, the cadres and combatants of the VPA's Division C assist the people in the production work. In total, they have spent 12,000 man-days to till land and transplant rainy season rice, from their economy, they have shared 1,896 kg of rice with needy families. They have helped build 5 health centers and 26 classrooms; mended 90 chairs and tables for the pupils; repaired and rebuilt 230 houses; given anti-cholera vaccinations to 2,700 persons, and showed films and movies to 15,000 people. [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1200 GMT 28 Aug BK]

SRV NAVY AGRICULTURAL AID--The Vietnamese naval forces on international duty in Koh Kong Province have actively contributed to stabilizing people's livelihood. Their cadres and combatants have rounded up 592 head of cattle, 72 pigs, and 400 fowls, and collected 592 sets of plow-harrow, 744 hoes, 140 knives and 15 oxcarts for the people. They have helped plant 1,500 ha of rice. Factories have been rehabilitated. A total of 17 trawlers are put back to use. Materials have been collected to build 18 schools with 41 classrooms for three quarters of the children in the province. [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1200 GMT 28 Aug 80 BK]

VPA DIVISION M-43 ASSISTANCE--The cadres and combatants of the Vietnamese Division M-43 have assisted in repairing and finishing bridges at various points in the plains in order to facilitate the flow of the traffic. In particular, a wooden bridge was completed in northern Stung Treng across a stream. [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1200 GMT 28 Aug 80 BK]

PREAH VIHEAR, KOH KONG ATTACKS--On 4 September 1980, our commandos raided a Vietnamese position at (Robonh) in Choam Khsan District, Preah Vihear Province, defended by a Vietnamese platoon. Within 25 minutes we totally crushed this position and killed 17 enemy troops. Seven dead bodies were left on the spot. We also seized an M-79, 3 AK's, 500 AK rounds and a quantity of other materiel. The survivors fled from the position in great panic. Long live the valiant army, guerrillas and people of the Choam Khsan battlefield in Preah Vihear Province! On 11 September 1980 our guerrillas in the Koh Kong Leu battlefield launched a commando raid on an enemy position below Phum Kum Russei east of the Mekong River, defended by two Vietnamese platoons. As a result, we inflicted 26 casualties on the enemy, including 15 killed on the spot, seized 5 AK's, 4,250 AK rounds and a quantity of materiel, and captured this position. The survivors fled in great panic. This is one of the events taking place at the end of this rainy season which clearly attests to the more capable combat strength of our army and guerrillas on the Koh Kong Leu battlefield as well as on all other battlefields. Long live the valiant army, guerrillas and people on the Koh Kong Leu battlefield! [Text] [BK191306 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 17 Sep 80]

SENEGAL SUPPORTS INDEPENDENCE--In his 9 September letter, sent in reply to Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary's 7 September letter informing the Senegalese Government about the Democratic Kampuchean Government's support for the resolution of the Islamic Conference which condemned the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan, Senegalese Foreign Minister Moustapha Niasse noted that Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary's analysis on the similarity of the root cause of the situation in Afghanistan and Democratic Kampuchea is correct and reasonable. In fact, the Afghan and Kampuchean peoples should be free to choose their own political and economic system without any outside interference in their capacity as sovereign, neutral and nonaligned countries. The Government of Senegal will further join hands with all other peace- and justice-loving countries to defend and encourage the efforts to solve these problems in this manner, which Senegal regards as the sole acceptable solution. [Text] [BK201040 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 18 Sep 80]

NORTH SISOPHON AUGUST BATTLES--In August our comrades in arms on the Thmar Tuk-Sisophon front north of Route 3 front killed or wounded 805 enemy troops, destroyed 4 trucks, a 105-mm gun, a 60-mm mortar, a B-40, 2 AK's, a C-25 radio set, a rice depot and 2 bridges; and seized an AK, 1,700 AK rounds, 7 AK magazines and a quantity of other war materiel. With the monthly plan being the inflicting of 800 enemy losses, our comrades in arms overfulfilled the plan. As for the results of their efforts to build the primitive weapons system, 7,863,900 new punji stakes were produced and planted, 450 punji pitfalls were dug and 500 trees were felled to block roads. [Excerpt] [BK191258 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 17 Sep 80]

SIEM REAP-ODDAR MEANCHEY BATTLES--In August our comrades in arms on the Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey battlefield put out of action 623 enemy troops, including a Vietnamese major killed, destroyed 3 trucks, an M-30 machinegun, 3 B-40's, 3 trenches and a quantity of various materiel and seized an AK, 37 60-mm shells, 26 B-40 rockets, 2,160 rounds, 24 cans of humanitarian food aid and a quantity of war materiel. Compared with the monthly plan to inflict 1,000 losses on the enemy, our comrades in arms fulfilled only 62.3 percent of the plan; that is, 37.7 percent less than the plan. This is because the Vietnamese troops, who were crushed in large numbers in previous months, lost the will to fight and seldom ventured out to conduct offensive drives. They cling tight in their positions. In their efforts to build the primitive weapons system, our comrades in arms produced and planted 825,000 new punji stakes, dug 530 punji pitfalls and felled 500 trees to block roads. [Excerpt] [BK220334 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 18 Sep 80]

KOH KONG PROVINCE BATTLE--After our army wiped out the positions along the stretch of road between Phum Dong and Trapeang Rung [in Koh Kong Province] defended by three Vietnamese platoons on 4 September, the Vietnamese enemy dispatched a mobile company to try to retake this stretch of road. Between 10 and 12 September our army in Thmar Sar District on the Koh Kong Kraom battlefield launched offensives against this Vietnamese mobile unit, putting out of action 47 enemy troops, including 22 killed on the spot. The survivors retreated in great panic. We continue to control this stretch of road between Phum Dong and Trapeang Rung. Also on 12 September our army and guerrillas in Thmar Sar District assaulted Vietnamese positions defended by two platoons along the road from Trapeang Rung to Andong Toek in Thmar Sar District. We put out of action 24 Vietnamese troops, including 15 killed on the spot, and cut this stretch of the road into pieces, thus preventing the Vietnamese enemy from using it. In sum, we killed or wounded 71 Vietnamese troops and cut and controlled a stretch of almost 50 kilometers of this transportation road. We have continued to attack and wipe out the Vietnamese troops along this transportation route. At present, the Vietnamese enemy on the Koh Kong Kraom battlefield is facing great difficulties since we have sliced its transportation routes and kept on attacking and inflicting heavy losses on it. The Vietnamese troops have lost the spirit to fight and simply huddle in their positions. Long live our heroic army, guerrillas and people on the Koh Kong Kraom battlefield! [Text] [BK200914 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 18 Sep 80]

SISOPHON AREA FIGHTING--Our army and guerrillas on the Sisophon-north of Route 5 battlefield have intensified their activities and successively crushed the offensive drives of the Vietnamese enemy. On 2 September our army and guerrillas crushed the drive by a Vietnamese company in an

area west of Phum Mkak. They put out of action 56 enemy troops, including 32 killed on the spot, and seized 8 AK's, 240 AK rounds and a quantity of war materiel. The survivors fled in great panic back to their position, but on the way they hit our punji stakes and mines, suffering a number killed or wounded. Long live the heroic army, guerrillas and people on the Sisophon-north of Route 5 battlefield! [Text] [BK20917 (as printed) (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 18 Sep 80]

SISOPHON DISTRICT BATTLE REPORT--On 5 September the Vietnamese aggressors sent a regiment of their troops to conduct an operation from Phum Soeng toward Phum Kakaoh in Sisophon District north of Route 5 (Battambang Province). There they fell into an ambush sprung by our army and guerrillas and ran into our primitive weapon network and minefields. Our army and guerrillas attacked them from all sides, detonating explosives, launching handgrenades and firing B-41 and B-40 rockets, driving them into panic. We kept attacking until 1600 on 7 September when this Vietnamese regimental operation was completely crushed. During 3 days and nights of fighting we killed 50 Vietnamese troops on the spot and wounded more than 20 others. The survivors fled into the jungle where they hit our punji stakes, fell into our punji pitfalls and stepped on our mines and bobbytraps. As a result, eight other Vietnamese troops were killed and five wounded. In sum, we put 83 enemy troops out of action--including a Vietnamese sublieutenant--destroyed an M-30 machinegun and seized a quantity of war materiel. Long live our valiant army, guerrillas and people on the Sisophon battlefield north of Route 5! [Text] [BK241232 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 21 Sep 80]

SISOPHON BATTLE SUCCESSES--In August our comrades in arms on the Sisophon front south of Route 5--Phnum Malai Hill, Mongkolborei and North Bavel--in Battambang Province killed or wounded 1,050 enemy troops; destroyed a 60-mm mortar, 2 12.7-mm guns, an M-30, a drum magazine machinegun, 4 B-40's, an M-79, 11 AK's, 5 barracks, a 10-km bridge at Banteay Ti Pi and a quantity of war materiel; and seized an AK, 4 CK's, 13 B-40 rockets, 3,000 AK rounds, 28 mines and a quantity of war materiel. Compared with the monthly plan to inflict 1,500 enemy losses, our comrades in arms fulfilled only 70 percent of the plan; that is, 30 percent less than the plan. This is because the enemy troops dared not venture out for offensive drives as they did in the previous months when we inflicted heavy losses on them. They cling tight in their positions. Our comrades in arms also produced 2,145,500 new punji stakes, set 955,000 punji stakes, dug 330 punji pitfalls and planted 250 mines and 170 bobby traps. In a production drive for self-support, our comrades in arms planted 35 ha of corn, 1,600 banana shoots, 21,400 cloves of tapioca, 1,400 rows of potatoes and 10 ha of various kinds of vegetables. [Excerpt] [BK191112 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 16 Sep 80]

O LHONG BATTLEFIELD ATTACKS--On the O Lhong battlefield in Bavel District, Battambang Province, the Vietnamese enemy aggressors have set up many defense positions along the trails and in the jungles. From 15 to 19 September our guerrillas launched simultaneous attacks against all Vietnamese defense positions at O Lhong on three occasions. At the same time, our army and guerrillas also completely cut off the transportation line of the Vietnamese enemy aggressors from Kompong Le to O Lhong. As a result of the fighting, we put out of action 140 Vietnamese troops. The survivors were routed and fled in disorder, leaving behind 66 dead. We destroyed an 82mm mortar and an M-30 machine-gun and seized a quantity of materiel. We also smashed a defense line of the Vietnamese enemy aggressors east of O Lhong and completely liberated the O Prakam position which was part of the defense network of the O Lhong position. At present, the O Lhong position is isolated from other positions and is under siege. The Vietnamese enemy troops are frightened and panic-stricken. They are compelled to remain huddled inside the position. We are continuing actively to attack Vietnamese in O Lhong section by section. Long live our valiant army, guerrillas and people of Bavel District, Battambang Province! [Text] [BK271156 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 26 Sep 80]

BATTAMBANG PROVINCE BATTLE REPORT--At 0440 on the morning of 27 September, our army and guerrillas on the Sisophon-south of Route 5 front in Battambang Province began an assault on the Vietnamese enemy at three positions--on a hill near Chamka Chas, at O Sralau and at O Sampor--by shelling these positions with B-40's, DK-75's and 82-mm mortars. Within only 15 minutes, our army and guerrillas totally smashed the position at the hill near Chamka Chas and took full control of the Srah Toek-o Sralau road. Seized by great panic, the Vietnamese troops at the other two positions started shooting blindly. As a result of this assault, we put 41 Vietnamese troops out of action, destroyed a DK-75, a DK-82 and an 80-mm mortar, set 11 barracks ablaze and seized a quantity of materiel. We also completely liberated the position on the hill near Chamka Chas, controlled the Srah Toek-o Sralau route and preserved our forces. Long live our valiant army, guerrillas and people on the Sisophon-south of Route 5 front! [Text] [BK080808 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 5 Oct 80]

GUERRILLAS ATTACK WESTERN BATTAMBANG--On the Phnum Malai-o Sralau battlefield, the Vietnamese enemy has set up positions on the roads and in the woods. Each position is defended by one or two platoons. These positions are under constant attack by our army and guerrillas. On 13 September 1980 our army and guerrillas organized forces to launch simultaneous attacks on six Vietnamese positions--in the vicinity of Srah Toek-o Sralau, in the vicinity of Phum Chamka Chas, west of O Sralau, in the vicinity of the O Sralau bridge, at Banteay O Sampor and east of O Sampor. At 1730 on 13 September 1980 we launched simultaneous assaults on these six positions. Within half an hour, we

thrust 10 to 30 meters deep inside these six positions. During this fighting, we put out of action 49 enemy troops including 23 killed on the spot, destroyed a 60-mm mortar, a drum-magazine machinegun and 4 AK's, and set ablaze 3 barracks. These six positions are under siege by our guerrillas, and are cut off from other positions. We have also sliced the Vietnamese transportation route between (?Prek Thom) and O Sralau. The Vietnamese troops on the Phnum Malai-o Sralau battlefield are in great panic and are asking for urgent assistance from their colleagues. Supplies to them can be provided only by helicopter. Our army and guerrillas have further surrounded, attacked and eroded the Vietnamese troops in this area. Long live the valiant army, guerrillas and people of the Phnum Malai-o Sralau battlefield! [Text] [BK240422 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 19 Sep 80]

16 SEPTEMBER BATTLE REPORT--In order to contribute to fulfilling the rainy-season plan to inflict 50,000 losses on the enemy, our army and guerrillas throughout the country have intensified attacks against the Vietnamese enemy, inflicting more losses. On the Ratanakiri-Stung Treng battlefield, we killed or wounded 45 enemy troops in attacks between 19 and 22 August. On the Mondokliri battlefield, we killed or wounded 43 enemy troops and seized 300 AK rounds in attacks between 19 and 23 August. On the Kratie battlefield, we put out of action 43 enemy troops and seized 400 AK rounds between 20 and 22 August. On the central region battlefield, we killed or wounded 51 enemy troops and seized 400 AK rounds in Chamka Leu District between 15 and 19 August. On the southwestern region battlefield, we killed or wounded 34 enemy troops and seized 10 cans of humanitarian food aid in Tuk Meas District between 5 and 9 August. In Kompong Chhnang Province we put out of action 46 enemy troops in attacks between 17 and 21 August. On the Battambang battlefield, we killed or wounded 138 enemy troops in attacks at Phnum Malai Hill, Mak Hoeun, O Sralau and Chambak Camp between 6 and 9 September. "In sum, on all these battlefields, including the Leach District front in Pursat Province, we killed or wounded 480 enemy troops, destroyed 3 machineguns and a number of assorted weapons, set ablaze a barrack, seized a quantity of weapons, ammunition and materiel and smashed 3 Vietnamese positions west of Anlung Reap in Western Leach District of Pursat Province." [Summary] [BK181108 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 16 Sep 80]

SOUTHWEST BATTLEFIELD--In August, our comrades in arms on the southwestern region battlefield put out of action 1,186 enemy troops, including 1 Vietnamese education official in Takao Province, 1 Vietnamese village official, 1 Vietnamese village military head and 1 sublieutenant killed. We destroyed two trucks, two M-30's, eight B-40's and B-41's, one M-79, two AK's, one AR-15, seven barracks and a quantity of war materiel. We seized 2 B-40 and B-41's, 4 M-79's, 8 AK's, 1 Ar-15, 7 B-40 rockets, 2 crates and 290 rounds of AK ammunition, 15 landmines, 5 handgrenades,

50 cans of humanitarian aid and a quantity of war materiel. With the monthly target set at 700 enemy casualties, we achieved 169 percent of the plan, overfulfilling it by 69 percent. Regarding the primitive weapons system, we produced and planted 998,500 new spikes, dug 1,400 punji pitfalls and felled 450 trees to block roads. [Excerpt] [BK020358 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 29 Sep 80]

MOUNG-PURSAT BATTLE FIGURES--In August our comrades in arms on the Moung-Pursat battlefield infiltrated deep into the areas temporarily controlled by the Vietnamese enemy. They actively implemented the three combat tactics against them, thus inflicting 229 casualties including a one-star senior officer, two three-star officers, two regiment commanders, three battalion commanders, one captain, two company commanders and three platoon commanders dead. They destroyed eight trucks, one pistol, two AK's, one C-46 and one C-25 radio, one barrack, two chests of Vietnamese currency and a quantity of war materiel. They seized two bolts of cloth and a quantity of other materiel. For the primitive weapon system, they produced and planted 79,600 new spikes, dug 350 punji pitfalls and felled 270 trees to block roads. [Excerpt] [BK020751 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 30 Sep 80]

KOH KONG LEU BATTLEFIELD--On 21 September our army and guerrillas on the Koh Kong Leu battlefield laid an ambush by detonating mines against the Vietnamese enemy on their communications line at the mouth of Kaoh Pao stream. In a single blow, we killed 25 Vietnamese troops, including 3 company commanders, 4 platoon commanders and a white-shirt foreigner. All the Vietnamese troops were killed; not a single one of them could escape. We seized 10 AK's, 200 dong, 600 meters of telephone wire and some materiel. Long live our valiant army, guerrillas and people of the Koh Kong Leu battlefield! [Text] [BK011450 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 28 Sep 80]

AMMUNITION DEPOTS ATTACKED--At 2400 on 25 September our commandos on the Koh Kong Leu battlefield attacked and destroyed three Vietnamese ammunition depots at the intersection of the main stream a short distance above Koh Kong town. These three Vietnamese ammunition depots were fully stocked with a large number of 82mm and 60mm mortar shells, B-40 rockets and AK ammunition. As a result of our attacks, these three depots exploded and burned for a day and a night. After the explosions, our inspection of the ammunition depots revealed that the Vietnamese left behind 37 corpses. The survivors had fled and abandoned the positions in panic. We completely captured and controlled the three positions. Long live our valiant army, guerrillas and people of the Koh Kong Leu battlefield! [Text] [BK041028 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 1 Oct 80]

NORTHEASTERN REGION ATTACKS--Last August our comrades in arms on the northeastern region battlefield put out of action 1,116 Vietnamese troops, killing a battalion commander, destroying 3 trucks, a boat, 4 B-40's, 2 M-79's, 8 AK's and some war materiel, and seizing 8 AK's, 2 CKC's, 2 AR-15's, B-40 rockets, 12 M-79 grenades, 1,220 rounds of AK ammunition, 12 cans of humanitarian aid food and other materiel. Compared with the 1,000-enemy-loss-a-month target, our comrades in arms fulfilled the plan by 111.6 percent, nearly 12 percent above the plan. With regard to primitive weapons, they made and planted 4,985,000 new punji stakes, dug 5,800 new punji pitfalls, made 2,700 new automatic bows, set 550 new snares and felled 2,100 trees to block roads. [Excerpt] [BK271246 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 26 Sep 80]

WESTERN REGION BATTLEFIELD--In August our comrades in arms on the western region battlefield killed or wounded 688 enemy troops, destroyed an M-30 machinegun, 4 B-40's and B-41's, 8 AK's and a quantity of materiel, and seized 2 B-40's, 8 AK's, 2 M-79's, 2 AR-15's, 8 B-40 rockets, 15 M-79 grenades, 450 AK rounds, 8 handgrenades and a quantity of war materiel. Compared with the monthly plan to inflict 500 enemy losses, our comrades in arms scored 137.6 percent of the plan; that is, they overfulfilled the plan by 37.6 percent. In their efforts to build primitive weapons system, our comrades in arms produced and planted 946,100 punji stakes, dug 1,300 punji pitfalls and felled 780 trees to block roads. [Excerpt] [BK290841 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 27 Sep 80]

ODDAR MEANCHEY PROVINCE BATTLES--Our army and guerrillas have constantly encircled and attacked the three Vietnamese positions north of Trapeang Trav in Oddar Meanchey Province. The Vietnamese troops in these positions have been in a great panic. Between 10 and 14 September 1980 our army and guerrillas launched simultaneous attacks on these three positions. They put out of action 37 enemy troops, including 16 who were killed on the spot. On the morning of 14 September 1980 the Vietnamese troops moved out of Kouk Mon in an attempt to rescue their colleagues who are being encircled in the area north of Trapeang Trav, but they ran into our guerrilla ambush. They suffered 23 killed or wounded, including 11 who were killed on the spot. In sum, we killed or wounded 60 Vietnamese troops, destroyed an M-30 machinegun, 3 B-40's, 2 barracks and a defense line and seized 146 mines. Long live the valiant army, guerrillas and people on the Trapeang Trav battlefield in Oddar Meanchey Province! [Text] [BK260818 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 25 Sep 80]

CENTRAL REGION BATTLEFIELD--In August our comrades in arms in the central region battlefield put out of action 1,036 enemy troops--including a company commander who was killed--destroyed 9 B-40's, 8 AK's, an AK-13 and a quantity of materiel, set a barracks on fire and seized a B-41, 4 AK's, 1 AK-13's, 1,000 AK rounds, 10 B-40 rockets and a quantity of war materiel. Compared with the monthly plan of attacking 700 enemy losses, our comrades in arms achieved 150.8 percent of the plan that is, they overfulfilled the plan by almost 51 percent. In their efforts to build primitive weapons system, our comrades in arms produced and planted 3,586,000 punji stakes, dug 5,000 punji pitfalls, made 3,400 booby traps and felled 1,800 trees to block roads. [Excerpt] [BK27085] (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 25 Sep 80]

NGUYEN CO THACH INCA SPEECH--At the United Nations on 1 October 1980, during a meeting with Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawettsila, Nguyen Co Thach, SRV foreign minister, again rejected the proposal by the five ASEAN countries and eight other countries calling for the United Nations to convene an international conference on the Kampuchean problem in order to discuss the withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops in accordance with UN Resolution 34/22. This rejection by Nguyen Co Thach clearly attests to the obstinate, tricky, aggressive and expansionist nature of the Vietnamese Le Duan clique, by refusing to comply with UN resolution, the clique has opposed the UN Charter and the persistent demand by all the peace, independence and justice-loving peoples and countries the world over, calling for the withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea in order to restore peace and stability in Kampuchea and also in all of Southeast Asia. This opposition shows the world that the Vietnamese Le Duan clique is extremely barbarous. It dares to commit aggression, expansion, annexation and genocide against other people and to do anything at will without the least regard for international law and the UN Charter that the whole world respects. For this reason, it is necessary for the world, particularly the current 35th UN General Assembly, to take concrete measures to pressure Vietnam to withdraw all of its aggressor troops from Kampuchea in accordance with UN Resolution 34/22 in order to restore peace in Kampuchea and to ensure long-lasting peace and stability in Southeast Asia. [Text] [BK030712 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 2 Oct 80]

WESTERN LEACH BATTLES--The O Kranhong position was located 5 km west of the Anlung Reap position. It was the command post of a Vietnamese regiment attached to the western Leach district and Metock River battlefields. This position was defended by a battalion. On 13 September our army and guerrillas on the O Kranhong front of the western Leach district battlefield launched an assault and fired 2K-75 shells into this Vietnamese position at O Kranhong. After the 25-minute attack, the Vietnamese were no longer able to withstand our powerful pressure. They were beaten and driven out of the O Kranhong position and fled trembling with fear toward the Anlung Reap position to the east. As a result, we killed or wounded 29 Vietnamese troops. Nineteen bodies were left behind on the battlefield.

We also destroyed six AK's, three B-40's and B-41's, an M-79, six barracks and five enemy trenches. We also seized some war materiel. At the present, our army and guerrillas on the western Leach district are intensifying their attacks against Vietnamese positions in the jungle areas. Long live our valiant army, guerrillas and people on the western Leach district battlefield! [Text] [BG241238 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 22 Sep 80]

PHUM KIRIVONG BATTLE--After thoroughly studying the terrain where a regiment of the Vietnamese enemy had taken position near the main camp in Phum Kirivong, our commandos in the Koh Kong Leu battlefield attacked this position from various sides. At 0600 on 15 September the commandos simultaneously fired at and assaulted the enemy's defense posts. The single onslaught resulted in 28 Vietnamese casualties and the destruction of three defense posts. Our commandos withdrew without loss. Long live our valiant army, guerrillas and people on the Koh Kong Leu battlefield! [Text] [BG241402 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 23 Sep 80]

CHAOM KHSAN-PREAH VIHEAR BATTLES--In August our comrades in arms on the Chaom Khsan-Preach Vihear battlefield put out of action 943 enemy troops, including 6 foreigners in white shirts, 2 big-nosed foreigners and 2 Vietnamese battalion and company commanders killed; destroyed or damaged 8 vehicles; smashed 3 B-40's, 15 AK's, an M-79, 2 AR-15's and a truckload of rice; set ablaze 11 barracks; and seized (? 8) AK's, an AR-15, 4 CM's, 290 AK rounds, a quantity of handgrenades, 20 cans of humanitarian food aid and a quantity of other materiel. Compared with the monthly plan to inflict 700 enemy losses, our comrades in arms scored 134.7 percent of the plan; that is, they overfulfilled the plan by almost 35 percent. In their efforts to build the primitive weapons system, our comrades in arms produced 858,800 new punji stakes, planted punji stakes on a 6-kilometer-long and 15 to 20-meters-wide area, dug 1,380 punji pitfalls, set 45 booby traps and 716 automatic bows, [words indistinct], planted 290 mines and felled 2,100 trees to block roads. In the production drive for self-support, our comrades in arms planted crops on 10 ha of land. [Excerpt] [BG240429 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 19 Sep 80]

PURSAT PROVINCE ATTACKS--On 7 September, the Vietnamese enemy gathered a company to launch a three-pronged operation. The first spearhead moved from (Ta Lou) in the direction of the Prey Thom cassava field; the second prong went from (Ta Lou) toward eastern Santuk Lake; and the third group also left (Ta Lou) for Prey Chang Lek Lake and Phum Som San. After learning of this Vietnamese drive, our army and guerrillas dispatched our forces to counterattack the enemy from four directions. The first spearhead was assigned to raid the Vietnamese command post; the second spearhead was to attack them at the Prey Thom

cassava field; the third group was assigned to attack them at the eastern Santuk Lake; and the fourth group was to attack them at Prey Khang Lek Lake and Phum Son San. At 0600 on 10 September, our guerrillas on all fronts simultaneously began firing and assaulting the enemy. In less than 15 minutes, we completely destroyed their command post, while their troops at other places fled in disorder and hit our mines, punji pitfalls and spikes once they were aware of the destruction to their command post and were assaulted by the guerrillas. They were lost in the bush and pursued. As a result, we put 37 of them out of action of which 13 were killed in the spot including the company commander. The remainder fled to their position in disarray. We defended our base and troops to the utmost. Long live the brave army, guerrillas and people in Bakan district, Pursat Province! [Text] [BK240432 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 20 Sep 80]

IENG SARY ATTENDS UN--The 35th UN General Assembly opened on 16 September 1980 in New York. The Democratic Kampuchean delegation, led by Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary, attended the opening ceremony along with 153 other member countries. The general assembly elected Rudiger von Wechmar, representative of West Germany, as its president and accepted (?Grenada) as the 154th member of the United Nations. [Text] [BK201042 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 18 Sep 80]

KAMPUCHEAN UN SHAT--In a recent interview with AP, Donald McHenry, U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations, strongly denounced the position advocating a vacant Kampuchean seat. He expressed concern over the formula for a vacant seat, as it represents the first step toward UN recognition of the Heng Samrin regime. To abstain from the UN vote is to fall into the Soviet trap and to serve the Soviet goal. The Soviets are seeking legalization of the Heng Samrin regime which they have installed. As the supporters, they will not abstain. Therefore, an abstention is tantamount to supporting Heng Samrin in his bid for the UN seat. [Text] [BK210458 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea 2330 GMT 20 Sep 80]

CSO: 4212

LAOS

BRIEFS

CIVIL AVIATION DELEGATION'S RETURN--Vientiane, 4 Oct (KPL)--The Lao civil aviation delegation led by its director Phoun Khammounheuang, on 2 October returned home from Canada after attending the 23rd general assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organisation held in Montreal. [Text] (BK04)359 Vientiane KPL in English 0935 GMT 4 Oct 80)

CSO: 4220

CENTRAL BANK TO TAP INTERNATIONAL LOAN

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 2 Oct 80 p 12

[Article by George T. Nervez: "CB To Tap Third \$100-M Jumbo Loan"]

[Text] SIX international financial institutions were given the mandate yesterday to syndicate a \$100-million loan for the Central Bank (CB) for its consolidated foreign borrowing program this year.

The loan is the third to be tapped by the CB this year under the 1980 borrowing program which was originally targetted to reach \$500 million.

Proceeds of the loan are relent to end-users in the public sector and private enterprises.

The six institutions that will syndicate the jumbo loan are the First Chicago Asia Merchant Bank, Ltd., The Industrial Bank of Japan Ltd., Ubaan-Arab Japanese Finance Ltd. on behalf of the Al-Ubaan Group, the United California Bank, West LB Asia Ltd., and the CCIC Finance Ltd.

GABRIEL Singon, senior deputy governor said the terms of the jumbo loan included an interest rate of 7/8 percent a year over the six-months LIBOR (London Inter-Bank Offered Rates), eight years maturity with four years grace, 3/4 percent management fee and a commitment fee of 1/2 percent per year.

The CB official said the terms are slightly higher because of the tightening of the international funds market due to the adverse developments abroad.

Nonetheless, the terms of the jumbo loan, although a bit higher compared to the two previous borrowings, are still very favorable than prevailing market rates, he added.

The two previous loans, \$200 million in February and \$100 million last August, carried interest rates of 3/4 percent over LIBOR.

SINGSON said that \$250 million out of the two previous loans have been relent or committed. There are pending applications for the remaining \$50 million.

He added that, hopefully, this will be the last jumbo loan this year, which means, the CB may not have to avail itself of the total amount of \$500 million originally targetted under the 1980 CFBP.

The consolidated foreign borrowing scheme had been very successful during the past two years that the CB adopted this borrowing strategy.

PHILIPPINES

OVERSEAS BANK CHANGES NAME TO COMBANK; RAISES EQUITY

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 3 Oct 80 p 9

[Article by George T. Nervez]

[Text]

THE inactive Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM), which is in the process of rehabilitation, will reopen in early January 1981 under a new name, the Commercial Bank of Manila (COMBANK).

The new name, according to Central Bank officials, is among the changes proposed by the new group of investors that have put up fresh funds to reopen the bank.

Also being proposed by the group is an increase in the bank's authorized capitalization to give more financial muscle to the rehabilitated bank.

The proposed changes are now pending with the CB's department of supervision and examination. If approved by the CB, the proposed changes will be endorsed to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

THE NEW owners, led by the Atrium Capital Corp., a member of the Herdis Group of Companies, have already raised the P180 million in

new capital which the CB required them to put up as a condition to reopen the OBM.

Under a new timetable, the bank is expected to reopen during the first or second week of January 1981.

The change in name is being sought by the new owners to remove the stigma of the OBM that was ordered closed by the CB more than 12 years ago when it came under liquidity pressure.

EARLIER, it was learned that the new owners have already submitted to the CB a total of P140 million in fresh funds required to reopen the bank. The remaining P40 million will be in the form of government securities acceptable to the CB.

Under the rehabilitation scheme, approved by the Monetary Board in May 1979, the new bank will get a P100 million credit line from the CB to help it during its initial days of resumption of operations.

CSO: 4220

JAPANESE INVESTMENTS DOUBLED LAST YEAR

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 3 Oct 80 p 10

[Text]

JAPANESE investments in the country last year reached \$102 million mostly in the form of acquisition of bonds and securities according to a recent report from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).

The MITI report showed that last year's direct foreign investments of Japanese businesses raised the share of the Philippines in the total overseas Japanese investment from 1.2 to two percent.

The MITI report showed that the Philippines is ranked 12th among the countries receiving direct investment from Japan.

Japanese investments here represent two percent of an estimated \$7.3 billion worth of direct overseas investments made by Japanese businesses in 1979, the MITI said.

THE PHILIPPINES is ranked fifth in Asia, next to Indonesia, Korea, Hongkong and Singapore, among the countries that received direct investments from Japan.

The Philippines is followed by Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan. The top recipient in the region is Indonesia which got 12.2 percent or about \$3.8 billion.

Meanwhile, a separate report from MITI said that Japan's official development assistance to developing countries reached \$2.6 billion in 1979, an increase of 19.1 percent from the previous year's \$2.2 billion.

The report also noted a favorable trend in Japan's lending terms. Average terms for development loans improved with an interest rate of 3.1 percent with a maturity of 27.7 years and a grace period of 9.1 years.

CSN: 4220

PHILIPPINES

BRIEFS

CANADIAN TRADE FAIR--Toronto--Philippine export firms which participated in the recent Canadian National Exposition made US\$201,828 from actual Canadian sale of their products during the 10-day annual fair. The 21 exhibitors also got orders worth \$70,900. The products included rattan and buri furnitures, costume jewelry, wood carvings, blouses and underwear, handwoven hats and placements and assorted shells, capiz and macrame wares. More than three million persons visited the fair, the largest in Canada which opened Aug. 13 and ended Sept. 1. [German C. Galian] [Text] [Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 3 Oct 80 p 11]

CSO: 4220

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY GENERAL INTERVIEWED

BK030900 Singapore STRAITS TIMES in English 2 Oct 80 pp 14, 17

[Interview with Thai National Security Council Secretary General Prasong Sunsiri by H.L. Limm and Lee Kim Chew of the STRAITS TIMES--date and place not given]

[Text] Question: I read in one of the English-language Thai newspapers on 19 September that the prime minister said there are only 300 villages which pose a security problem. The report did not say where the villages are situated. Where are the villages and why are they still a security problem?

Answer: My prime minister feels that right now only 300 villages are under the influence of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). It does not mean that the CPT occupies the villages. They are only under the influence of the CPT. In Thailand we have more than 50,000 villages, so the percentage is very small.

But many villages were under the influence of the CPT. About 5 years ago, we tried very hard to secure them, to make the villages turn their attention to the security situation and to get their full cooperation. So, year by year, it is becoming better. Still, the CPT has insurgents in villages in the northeast, and in the south, and very few in the central areas. Most of the villages under the influence of the CPT are in the northeast, secondly, in the south, and thirdly, in the north.

Remember the terrain of our country; for instance, in the north, even though they are small villages under the influence of the CPT, the insurgents are strong in the military sense because the high mountains of the area are connected to Laos and Burma, so it is very easy for the insurgents to stay or to escape.

In the south, too, the reason why military activities of the CPT are strong is the terrain. In the northeast, only some areas like Sakhon Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom have mountains. But in most of the villages in the northeast, the activity is political and non-military. Politics lead the military in the northeast. In the north, military leads politics, and in the south military leads politics, too.

Question: When you say there is more military activity than political in the north and south, do you mean activity by the CPT insurgents?

Answer: For about 2 years now our forces have initiated most of the activities; before that they were initiated by the CPT. About 2 years ago, the international situation changed--the conflict between China and Vietnam, the situation in the Indochina states, the fighting in Kampuchea, communists fighting communists--all these affect the CPT.

So the communists changed their tactics. Instead of attacking like before, they try to keep quiet and try to persuade the Thai people by pointing their finger to the enemy--Vietnam. They change their tactics--military activity initiated by CPT slows down. They switch to politics. They try to get the support of the Thai people, saying they are friends. They will fight the enemy outside, they will fight with Vietnam, so Vietnam is the enemy.

"Join together to fight Vietnam" they say. They try to do this, but we know this tactic. The CPT is, like my prime minister said, a big problem for our internal security, because the CPT has changed its tactics but it does not change its strategy. So my prime minister pointed out to the Thai people that the first problem or priority for the Thai Government is the CPT.

Question: We read somewhere that the CPT is split into a pro-China and a pro-Russia faction. Is that true?

Answer: I have heard, but we think that pro-Vietnam or pro-Soviet is just talk initiated by only a few people, not organised yet. But we have to watch closely, because many years ago some leaders of the CPT were trained in Hanoi.

Question: You said that most of the 300 villages are situated in the northeast. How many percent of the 300 are in the north?

Answer: Forty to 50 percent are in the northeast, about 30 percent in the north, and about 20 percent in the south.

Question: What is the strategy to reduce CPT influence in the villages?

Answer: My prime minister is the director of communist suppression and had a lot of experience during the time when he was the commander of the Second Army in the northeast. He has a lot of experience fighting the CPT. We have a lot of experience in the villages on our side.

So this year, as he is the prime minister, the Thai Government has a clear policy about the CPT. This policy concentrates on how to secure the villages, how to give the people in the rural areas a better standard of living, and how to ensure justice from the authorities.

We concentrate on this and, at the same time, we suppress the communists. We know exactly where they are. We suppress. But we concentrate on improving the lot of our people.

Question: Is this concentration on the quality of life of the people a new policy insofar as the anti-communist fight is concerned?

Answer: This is a new policy.

Question: Only from this year?

Answer: This has been our policy for some years, but we are really implementing it now.

Question: Has the policy been announced yet?

Answer: Announced already many months ago, and right now the many ministries concerned try to implement the policy.

Question: Can you give us details of how these various things are being done? How to make life better; how to ensure justice from the authorities; the various other projects?

Answer: Maybe you have heard that the latest budget of the Thai Government allocates about 3,500 million baht to the rural areas in all parts of the country. With this money, we can expand employment and improve health, social activities and concentrate on how to build up education, including vocational education.

Question: Is that part of the Tambon scheme?

Answer: Yes. This is the Tambon scheme which is directed at rising the standard of living in the rural areas and to counter the CPT. The Tambon scheme is not new, but we did not concentrate on it. No money. The money was scattered throughout various ministries.

Question: The Tambon scheme--is this under the prime minister's direction?

Answer: Yes, and he himself goes to observe the work or follow-up himself.

Question: When was the Tambon scheme started?

Answer: During the time when Khukrit Pramot was prime minister, in 1975. But the government changed and, with the changes, some policies changed, too, even when they were good policies. No follow-up.

Question: What is the strength of the CPT now?

Answer: About 10,000, armed, all over the country.

Question: Has there been a decline in the number of armed communists over the last 5 years? Or has there been an increase?

Answer: I think the number of armed insurgents is still the same, but supporters or sympathisers who used to stay with CPT members have escaped and surrendered to the authorities.

Question: Do you have an idea where their arms come from?

Answer: I should say some from the attacks and ambushes on the military or the police. When they succeed in an attack, they take arms and ammunition. But they also have support from outside.

Question: Where from?

Answer: You can make a good guess.

Question: The radio broadcasts (from China) are now off?

Answer: Yes, it's better. There have been no broadcasts.

Question: Not since when?

Answer: Some time last year.

Question: Apart from the CPT, what else is causing security problems for Thailand?

Answer: I think that the problem most affecting Thai security right now is from outside, especially from Indochina, the fighting among communists in Indochina. That especially affects Thai security along the border. And the appearance of the Soviets, increasing month by month in Vietnam, is a threat to ASEAN countries.

We have to look out for our country. The CPT we can tackle and contain. But events outside are out of our control. For example, the situation in Kampuchea, where there is an increasing number of Vietnamese troops--at present at least 200,000. Almost two-thirds of these forces, I mean the Vietnamese, are in the western part of Kampuchea, along the Thai border.

Question: Do you think there is any truth in the report by one news agency that Soviet advisers were seen with Vietnamese forces near the border in Kampuchea?

Answer: It may be true, because right now about 500 Soviets are inside Kampuchea. Most of them are at Kompong Som to reconstruct the port and construct communication lines between Kompong Som and Phnom Penh. Some military advisers are also in Phnom Penh.

Question: Do you have any information whether Soviet advisers are taking part in operations against the various Kampuchea guerrilla groups?

Answer: They have Soviet military advisers in Phnom Penh. At Siem Riep airfield, there are some Soviet military officers, and some in Battambang. But it is unnecessary for the Soviets to come and fight. Vietnam uses them for support and advice, like in installation of sophisticated military equipment.

Question: Do you think the presence of Soviet advisers is a worrisome development?

Answer: Yes. Already there are many, many hundred thousands of Vietnamese troops at the Thai border. They don't use the pen, they use the gun.

Question: What about the Thai-Lao border? How do you perceive the security situation there?

Answer: The Vietnamese have 50,000 troops inside Laos, and there are only 36,000 Lao troops. But along the Thai-Lao border, it is quiet.

Question: Is it true that the Vietnamese have integrated the Lao Army into theirs? There is only one army now in Laos?

Answer: No, it is still separate. But they have advisers and trainers in every company, battalion, and even in civilian ministries. In each division, each department, they have Vietnamese advisers.

Question: Has the reopening of the Nong Khai border crossing point lessened tension and improved relations between Thailand and Laos?

Answer: Things have improved.

Question: Any likelihood of more border points being reopened?

Answer: No, not yet.

Question: But the Lao have requested it?

Answer: The Lao ambassador has requested, but we won't reopen yet.

Question: What exactly do you mean by not yet? Is there some time-frame?

Answer: We closed the border because of the security of Thailand. That is the reason. When we see that the security situation is okay, we will open more crossings.

Question: Does that depend on the Kampuchean situation?

Answer: When I talk about Laos, that means Laos. Kampuchea is different from Laos. But anyhow the situation inside Kampuchea and Laos is the same.

Question: Internally, are the refugees a security problem both in terms of the burden, economic and social, on Thailand and the possibility of infiltrators?

Answer: The refugees do not represent a threat. They came here because they were forced out by the Vietnamese. They came here hungry, in bad health. They need food, need doctors, need shelter, so these people are not a threat by themselves.

While we protect and accept them temporarily for humanitarian reasons, they are illegal immigrants. So we keep them in certain areas, like the holding centres. We try to sort out now who is the fifth column and who is a genuine refugee, especially the Vietnamese. We separate them.

Question: Are there many Vietnamese refugees, genuine or otherwise?

Answer: Many thousands.

Question: I understand there are 6,000.

Answer: So far we have identified about 4,000 Vietnamese military people.

Question: So these are people you are satisfied are not genuine refugees?

Answer: Yes, about 4,000.

Question: Out of how many Vietnamese refugees?

Answer: Vietnamese refugees have been coming by boat, but right now they are also coming across Kampuchea. They come from Saigon in Vietnam and bribe the authorities in Kampuchea. The Vietnamese, because they cannot walk from Vietnam to the Thai border, they come by truck. It is a long way. They come in military trucks and, when they come near the border, they walk.

So we contain them at one place, at Prasa Sarokok. The UNHCR [United Nations High Commission for Refugees] calls it the NW9 camp. All the 4,000 are there now, separate from those who are civilians. There are a total of 8,000 Vietnamese. This does not include the boat people, only the land people.

Question: What is the rate of their arrival this year?

Answer: Right now the refugees come to the Thai border in small numbers, because the Vietnamese sent many troops to seal the border. They don't want the people to come and receive food aid across the land bridge. At the same time, they try to stop the Kampuchean refugees from going back to their country. So that's why the number is small.

I have asked the Kampuchean people when they come to receive the food and how they can pass the Vietnamese troops, and they say they pay.

Question: But the Vietnamese refugees can also pay?

Answer: Already paid.

Question: Do you think the refugee situation at the Thai-Kampuchean border is under control?

Answer: Situation is okay, but we don't let them come to the holding centres anymore. They stay in camps along the border to receive food; places like Nong Chan, Ban Thap Prik, Nong Preu, many many other feeding points.

Question: So the strategy is not to have any more in the holding centres?

Answer: Full house--no ticket.

Question: Somebody told us that there are about a million Kampucheans along the borders who can come over if there is a battle.

Answer: If there is fighting, they might come across the Thai border.

Question: You said only a small number of Vietnamese come across the border now. Can you say how many a week or how many a month?

Answer: I don't have the figures right now. But they are smaller. The reasons I have told you. The Vietnamese want to show they can control the people and situation in Kampuchea, and request direct aid to Phnom Penh. But what they claim is not true.

Inside Kampuchea, distribution of food is not to the Kampuchean people. When the UN officials distribute food through Phnom Penh, they have to give to the Vietnamese authorities. The Vietnamese then take the UN people to some villages they can control. When they distribute food in front of the UN people sometimes they invite Western reporters to go along and watch. After that, at night, the Vietnamese go and take the food back.

Question: The international relief organisations are very vehement in denying this. They say the Thais are not there whereas they are there. They insist there is no evidence at all.

Answer: Because they did not see with their own eyes. But I tell you from intelligence reports. I don't want to tell you how I know. But it is correct that the food finally falls into Vietnamese hands. They only distribute in front of Western reporters, but at night they take back.

Question: Zia Rizvi, the UNHCR regional coordinator, recently announced a US\$14 million programme...

Answer: That is a UNHCR programme I don't want to be concerned with. But Rizvi mentioned that 170,000 Kampuchean refugees are already back from Thailand. I don't know where he got that number from, because on a voluntary basis we repatriated only 9,999 Kampucheans about 10,000. But Rizvi, I read in the newspapers, said about 170,000. They said there are a lot of Kampuchean refugees back in Kampuchea.

They might think that they returned from Thailand. But, you know, the Vietnamese bring a lot of the Vietnamese Khmers from South Vietnam to replace the Kampucheans who have left. The Vietnamese replace the Kampucheans with their own people.

Question: These are Khmers who have lived in Vietnam for many years?

Answer: Yes.

Question: What area of Kampuchea is that? Why are they doing this?

Answer: Parrot's Beak and some towns near Vietnam, at the southeastern part of Kampuchea.

Question: That may tie in with what Khieu Samphan told us yesterday. He said only in that area they have no guerrillas--Svay Rieng and Prey Veng.

Answer: That is under tight control by Vietnam because of their replacement policy.

Question: Khieu Samphan told us that his forces are very strong along one belt in the north and the whole belt in the west, the areas of hot activity because of the Vietnamese presence. In the rest of the country, except for the area in the southeast, he has a lot of guerrillas and political cadres. Do you think he was exaggerating, or is he substantially correct?

Answer: Right now, most people think that the Democratic Kampuchean troops stay only at the Phnom Malai mountains, Phnom Mak Hoeun, Phnum Chhat like at the Cardamomes. But it is not true. They are scattered in central Kampuchea, from Preah Vihear to Oddar Meanchey until Kompong Cham, Kompong Thom, Battambang--and scattered around Phnom Penh, the capital.

Sometimes they ambush the trains. I should say that the DK troops right now are in the stage of strategic defensive. They are going to the second stage, strategic offensive.

Question: How long more?

Answer: I don't know; you should ask Khieu Samphan. Strategic defensive. It means they can establish in some villages and they have some people to support them. Otherwise they cannot stay.

Question: Khieu Samphan said the Vietnamese dare not go into some areas...

Answer: Previously, Vietnamese forces could launch a major attack almost anywhere. Now when they, the Vietnamese, come to the DK's strategic defensive areas, it is not like before. So they have moved some troops and some artillery to protect some highways. They move in new troops to replace the old, because those have been stuck in the field for a long time and the morale is very low.

Question: Khieu Samphan also said that his military position will be better in the dry season. That was very surprising to us, because we thought the dry season is better for the Vietnamese.

Answer: I should say that fighting will continue and there is a strategic stalemate in Kampuchean. The Vietnamese cannot do more than before.

Question: Strategic statement now or in the dry season?

Answer: This is the rainy season and the Vietnamese cannot suppress the DK troops like the previous time. At the same time, the DK troops try to build up in the villages.

So when the dry season comes, it means that the Vietnamese troops might have to fight with the Kampuchean people more than before. Fighting might happen when the dry season comes. But fighting with a lot of Kampuchean. Previously, they only fought with the guerrillas.

Question: A source of ours estimates that the DK forces will be wiped out in 6 months.

Answer: I don't think so. Three years from now, 5 years from now, the DK people will be there.

Question: Is it also true that the DK forces used to operate three-man hit-and-run units, and that now they are operating bigger forces and are able to take on a full company-strength Vietnamese force?

Answer: I believe that's true.

Question: Khieu Samphan also said recently that they ambushed and killed a Vietnamese field commander near the Leach district.

Answer: I don't know.

Question: Recently you attended a conference in Hat Yai on the separatist problem. What is the government going to do now?

Answer: The separatist movement is very small. They are bandits and they claim they are the separatist movement. But it is a problem we have to solve. Anyhow, I should say that the police or military down there can suppress this thing.

Question: Do they have the support of the Muslim population, the bandits?

Answer: Like the CPV, they come from families in the area, so the families try to support them. If you take a village in a remote area, treat them fairly, give them education, that's good for cooperation with the authorities.

Question: Does the Tambon scheme extend to the Muslim areas?

Answer: All over the country.

Question: And you have as much confidence in the Tambon scheme in the south as in the....

Answer: We have the basic plan for economic and social development under the Tambon scheme. We select what is the priority of that part of the province. It is like politics guiding the military.

Question: Khieu Samphan said he has 60,000 fighting men and 50,000 guerrillas based in villages--a total of 110,000. Does that sound like a reasonable figure?

Answer: Let me put it like this: Right now, Khieu Samphan says he has 60,000 troops. You know, each soldier has his supporters that's a guerrilla tactic. At least five to 10 supporters each. Right now in Kampuchea, the Vietnamese have 200,000 troops....

Question: They say 250,000....

Answer: Because new divisions just came from South Vietnam....

Question: When was that?

Answer: About 1 month ago.... So you see, 200,000 troops against the DK troops plus supporters, at least 100,000, the ratio is two to one. This ratio is not enough to suppress the guerrillas. In South Vietnam before, or anywhere when you fight guerrillas, the ratio of the troops used is 10 to one, and the ratio in Kampuchea is just two to one. So, you see, how can the DK forces be wiped out in 6 months?

Question: Is it true that the Russians are trying to build up Kompong Som as an alternative to Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam so they can bargain better with the Vietnamese?

Answer: That is their objective.

Question: Some quarters believe that the Vietnamese will attempt another incursion into Thailand. Do you think that is probable?

Answer: During the past month, the Vietnamese have reinforced their divisions near the Thai border and have moved much military equipment and ammunition to the area.

There has been an increased frequency in flights of Soviet AN-12 transport planes to areas near the border. Helicopter pads have been built near Siemphom for helicopters capable of carrying 65 troops each. The Vietnamese 7th antiaircraft artillery brigade has been transferred from Phnom Penh to a place near the Thai border.

These are indications that there may be some military actions near the Thai border. These activities are too enormous for the purpose of an operation against the resistance groups.

CSOR 4220

THAILAND

ISOC PAYWAR CHIEF CLARIFIES POSITION ON SUPPORTING FORCE

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 6 Aug 80 p 5

[Letters to the Editor column by Major General Seni Chamnienwai, the Head of the Psychological Operations Section, Civilian Affairs Division, Internal Security Operations Command: "ISOC Clarifies MP Report"]

[Text] In reference to an article by Mr Samphan Thungsamak, a member of the House of People's Representatives from Nakhon Si Thammarat, that appeared in the 16 June 1980 edition of the Newspaper SIAM RAT, it was stated that the various types of training given to villagers have not received any monetary support from the government and that the people receiving training have not been supervised.

These statements are not quite correct and they may cause misunderstanding among the people and have a damaging effect on activities beneficial to the security of the country. Thus, so that the people know the truth and have the facts, the Internal Security Operations Command would like to point out the following:

1. This training, which the Internal Security Operation Command approves of because of the beneficial effects it will have on the security of the country and which it supports, includes the training of members of Voluntary Development and Self-Defense Villages in accord with the Voluntary Development Village Act of 1975 and the training of members of the Thai Volunteers for National Defense in accord with the order from the Office of the Prime Minister dealing with the Thai Volunteers for National Defense that was promulgated on 4 September 1978. The principles and specifics for training the members of these two groups have already been fully stipulated.

2. Concerning the training of members of the Voluntary Development and Self-Defense Villages, the government has prepared a budget to provide support appropriate for the training periods. Support will be provided for training equipment and for the living expenses of the members.

3. The same is true for members of the Thai Volunteers For National Defense. Government officials have not asked for any money from the members or solicited contributions. And in order to prevent any officials from making such requests, the Thai Volunteers For National Defense Center has established a budget to support the training. Concerning this, on 20 April 1979, it issued Thai Volunteers For National Defense Center Order No 1/1979 concerning the training and establishment of Thai Volunteers For National Defense. This order stipulated four types of fiscal support:

(a) The established budget of the Thai Volunteers For National Defense Center. (b) Monetary support from the Ministry of Interior. (c) Monetary support from the Organization for Local Administration and (d) monetary support from those who are willing to make sacrifices for the good of the country.

4. Thus, it can be seen that the government has not neglected to support the Internal Security Operations Command in its activities and that it has insisted that the originating sectors responsible carry on training so that they maintain their readiness in carrying on the training. It wants quality rather than simply more members than at present.

5. As for following the progress of the members after the training has been completed, the government does not abandon them. As mentioned above, regulations for following and evaluating their progress have been stipulated. Help is given and recommendations are made about how the activities should be carried on so that they are of benefit to the members, the community and the nation. This has been stated clearly in the acts, regulations and orders concerning this matter.

6. As for helping the members and families who have volunteered or who have been asked to help, the defense officials who are fighting for peace, order and national security have issued orders and regulations dealing with compensatory help. These too have been stipulated in detail.

7. So that everyone knows, the Internal Security Operations Command wants to affirm that in training the members of these two groups, [the spirit] of solidarity, voluntariness and sacrifice of the people is the basis. People are not recruited

and no coercion of any sort is used. No thought has been given to paying people so that they will love and do things for their country and there is certainly no policy of doing this. The only thing that is done is to foster the awareness and sense of responsibility that the people have and that they are showing for the country.

This has been presented for everyone's clarification.

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THAILAND

AIR DEFENSE DRILL REVEALS WEAKNESSES

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 9 Aug 80 pp 1, 12

[Article: "Air Defense Drill Reveals Weaknesses. There Was a Lack of Weapons and a Lack of Coordination"]

[Text] Many weaknesses were revealed from the air defense drills. The coordination between the various units was not as good as it should have been since this was the first drill in 35 years. The supreme commander disclosed that he will purchase additional anti-aircraft guns.

For the first time in 35 years, since the end of World War II in 1945, an air defense drill was held in Bangkok in stipulated areas, particularly in the Northern Metropolitan Factory at the lower end of the Phra Ram 6 bridge. This was very strange to people who have not reached middle age but, for those over 40 years old, it brought back memories of the atrocities of war inflicted on Thailand by the Second World War.

General Soem Na Nakhon, the supreme commander, and both deputy supreme commanders, General Charoen Phongphanit and Admiral Phanthum Thawiwong, went early yesterday morning to inspect the drill area.

Three F5 fighter planes posing as the enemy flew overhead and so alarmed some of the people in the area that they stopped working. However, [most] people showed little interest since the mass media had informed them about the drill ahead of time.

Several tanks mounted with anti-aircraft guns from the 4th Battalion of the Anti-Aircraft Division under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Samphao Chusi carried out their duties in "destroying" the enemy aircraft that had slipped through past the air defense center of the Don Muang Air Force. Concerning

the activities of this unit, it must check the direction of flight of the enemy and the number of aircraft and it must check to see whether the aircraft are enemy aircraft.

"Air defense in Bangkok has many weaknesses because there are many buildings and little open land and, therefore, it is difficult to deploy forces," reported Lieutenant Colonel Samphao Banyai to the supreme commander. After that, "enemy" aircraft flew low overhead but the anti-aircraft guns, which used blank shells, did not fire properly. This caused some grumbling among the people watching. However, parts of the drill were real. In particular, the pilots of the "enemy" aircraft carried out very acrobatic maneuvers. The defense units, however, made so many mistakes that some people said that "if Vietnam invades us, we are finished."

At the same time, the area around the Northern Metropolitan Factory took very life-like action to put out a fire at the electrical power plant, which is the main producer of electricity for the Central Region of the country. Bombs were set off and an area prepared ahead of time was burned. A firetruck arrived to put out the fire but the water on the firetruck would not come out.

It is not felt that the actions carried out on these days made General Soem Na Nakhon very happy. He stated that the air defense drills carried out the past 4 to 5 days had pointed out many weaknesses. For example, the equipment and tools will have to be improved and much more equipment is needed. Besides this, the coordination between the various units was not as good as it should have been since there have not been any drills for a long time.

The supreme commander also stated that the army will have to purchase many additional radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns in order to greatly improve the efficiency of our air defenses.

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SOUTHERN SEPARATISTS HAVE SET UP 'REPUBLIC OF PATTANI'

Bangkok TAWAN SIAM in Thai 6 Aug 80 pp 6, 12

[Politics, an Interesting Subject column by Dr Pricha Hongkrailoet]

[Text] The terrorist separatists, who are on a rampage in the three southern provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala, are presently causing great unrest among the Buddhists and Muslims and the authorities.

A newspaper has gone and interviewed the leaders of the terrorist separatists, who are hiding in the Budo mountains. Based on the interview with the terrorist separatist leaders, it can be stated in short that the terrozists are resolutely determined to "separate" this area to form a "republic" called the "Republic of Pattani" with a presidential form of government. In accord with this, the terrorist separatists have already formed a cabinet. Also, they have received financial support, weapons and other war materials and other forms of help from abroad.

In reality, to solve the terrorist separatist problem in the south, we should not give much importance to these terrorist separatists because this will only increase their "self-importance" even though, in reality, there is no possibility that they will succeed in separating this area [from the rest of Thailand]. Thus, if the newspapers or other mass media present news items in a way that "recognizes the status" of the "Republic of Pattani," this may easily place us at a disadvantage concerning "political strategy" since the leaders of the terrorist separatists will be able to claim that even the newspapers and other mass media in Thailand recognize the status of the separatists.

This writer feels that instead of attaching importance to these terrorist separatists, we should stop presenting news items

that might build up their importance. Or instead of presenting news about these terrorists, we should not talk about matters relating to them at all because if we keep talking about them, this is the same as "recognizing the status" of these terrorists. This group is perhaps cutting out the stories in the Thai newspapers and sending them to the "countries that are supporting them" with the hope of obtaining financial help, weapons and other forms of aid since [such news items] means that these terrorists have achieved good "results."

This writer thinks that if reporters from the Thai mass media frequently "interview" the leaders of the terrorist separatists, these separatists may formulate plans to use the "interviews" with them as a "tool" to easily drive a wedge between Thailand and Malaysia. Because at present, in the area along the Thai-Malaysian border, events that have an effect on both countries have taken place frequently. Concerning the Thais and Malaysians, if agitators are allowed to promote "discord" between Thailand and Malaysia, this will be of great benefit to the enemies of Thailand and our enemies are not far off; they are the Communist Party of Thailand.

The Communist Party of Thailand is a terrorist group that is more efficient than the terrorist separatists and other terrorists. This is because the members are disciplined and they have strong ideals. Also, they have a base on which to rely in carrying out their operations and they receive various forms of support from abroad. The terrorist separatists, however, are only a "united front."

Therefore, we should be careful about presenting mass media news in ways that promote the actions of the terrorist separatists.

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THAILAND

COLUMNIST CRITICIZES PREM FOREIGN POLICY

Bangkok TAWAN SIAM in Thai 4 Aug 80 p 4

[Angkhri Charoenrat column by Angkhri Charoenrat]

[Text] Thailand and Malaysia:

If we stand and look down at Thailand at present from a high point and think deeply for a moment, the feeling that arises is one of fear.

The reason for this is that no one can tell for sure whether the foreign policy of the present government is right or wrong.

But a phenomenon that is clearly visible is that Thailand has become the enemy of the Indochinese countries.

Because such is the case, it can be presumed that this is the result of carrying out a policy that is too tough and that is completely inflexible.

However, since the government has elected to take this path and has already implemented such a policy, the Thais who entrusted the government with the task of governing the country must accept this.

Once this has been accepted, it can be proposed that the government should review its foreign policy.

Four months have passed and that is enough time to tell whether the results have been good or bad.

Another important thing is that the government should realize and acknowledge that, in carrying on matters in the sphere of foreign affairs, if it is discovered that we are isolated and

that we are surrounded by enemies, that is a failure. For example, there are the events that have taken place in Malaysia. These events have had an effect and the problems are gradually piling up but no one has given any thought to solving them.

Malaysian soldiers captured and killed four Thais, charging that they were communist terrorists; but it appears that they were not terrorists.

The real reason for this involves cheating over the profits being made from crossing the border to obtain rubber.

Besides this, whenever the Thai side tries to suppress the terrorist separatists, they flee into Malaysia. They can do this because they hold two passports and two nationalities.

In the end, if this problem is not solved, Thailand and Malaysia may drift apart in the near future.

As stated above, Thailand has become the enemy of neighboring countries on three sides: Laos, Kampuchea and Vietnam.

For the reasons presented above, it can be said that we are being surrounded militarily.

And if the problems with Malaysia cannot be solved, Thailand will become even more isolated.

In such a situation, if an emergency arises, we will have only one way out and that is to take to the Gulf of Thailand.

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THAILAND

POPULATION INCREASE SLOWS

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 8 Aug 80 p 3

[Article: "Thailand Has A Population of 47.17 Million People. Family Planning Has Been Effective"]

[Text] The Population Program expects that in 1980 Thailand will have a population of approximately 47.17 million and a rate of increase of approximately 1.2 percent. This can be compared to the population in 1970 when the population in Thailand was only 36.37 million.

A report from the Population Program, Ministry of Public Health, stated that based on the results of the last four population censuses conducted every 10 years, it appears that the population of Thailand was as follows: In the first population census conducted in 1937, the population was 14.36 million. In 1947 the population was 26.26 million and in 1970 the population was 36.37 million. As for the population and family census in 1980, when discussing trends concerning family planning, the Population Program estimates that the population in Thailand in 1980 will reach approximately 47.17 million.

The Population Program has disclosed that in the period from 1937 to 1947, the population of Thailand increased at a rate of 1.9 percent per year. Between 1947 and 1960, it increased at a rate of 3.2 percent per year. Between 1960 and 1970, the rate of increase was 3.3 percent per year and between 1970 and 1980 it was only 2.1 percent.

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EDITORIAL HITS 'HUMANITARIAN' REASONS FOR ACCEPTING REFUGEES

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 25 Aug 80 p 5

[Editorial: "Refugees-- An International Social Problem"]

[Text] It has been roughly estimated that, at present, the United States is taking in approximately 1 million people a year. This includes those people who enter the country illegally and refugees from every corner of the world, such as from Africa, Europe, Asia and, in particular, Indochina. Several months ago, United States President Jimmy Carter announced that the United States would, beginning 1 October this year, admit between 8,000 to 10,000 Indochinese refugees per month.

Based on the comments of ordinary Americans, they are beginning to feel that their country is becoming a center for people of all nationalities and races. They have begun to question whether this will cause social problems and whether American society will be able to "absorb" these people and turn them into real Americans at a time when the United States is experiencing an "economic recession."

We sympathize greatly with the United States for having to accept more refugees than any other country and we admire the government of President Carter for its generosity in accepting the refugees from Indochina, which is greatly reducing the heavy responsibilities of the Thai government at present.

We have a rather serious opinion about this matter and that is that the flow of people out of the communist countries has occurred continuously. We can see clearly, especially in Indochina, that this started in Laos and Kampuchea and then Vietnam. Following this, the problem arose in Cuba. At the same time, Afghanistan was invaded and this caused hundreds of thousands of refugees to flee to Pakistan.

We also feel that this flow of refugees out of the communist countries has occurred in a systematic way, just as if they were being expelled in order to "destroy" the economy of the free world. In other words, the communist world, especially the Soviet bloc, is using a "social strategy" to destroy the social structure of the free world.

The above is an assumption of ours and whether it is true or not depends on what angle you view the refugee problem from.

The Soviet bloc knows that the "weak point" of the free world is that these are religious, "humanitarian" countries. The Soviet bloc has thus used this "humanitarianism" to threaten the free world in order to make the entire world communist in accord with the highest ideals of that side.

All of the above seems very "prejudiced" against communism but what can be done when such facts cannot be denied?

We once asked the Soviet ambassador to Thailand why the Soviet Union did not accept some refugees from Indochina in order to help some of these people. His reply was that the "Soviet Union did not create this problem." You, the reader, can think about why we have made this assumption.

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THAILAND

ANTISMUGGLING DRIVE STYMIED; INVESTIGATORS MURDERED

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 21 Aug 80 pp 1, 12

[Article: "Smuggling of Ore Said to Be Difficult to Suppress; the Problem of Influential Persons Has Been Encountered"]

[Text] The Department of Customs has pointed out problems in suppressing the transporting of smuggled ore. Complete results have not been achieved because influential people are behind this. Several secret agents of the department have been murdered.

Mr Wira Chantharasi, the secretary of the Department of Customs, talked with a reporter about the problem and the obstacles in suppressing the transporting of smuggled ore out of the country by sea. This results in the country losing billions of baht per year. Concerning the smuggled ore trade, usually there are influential persons behind this and this makes it very difficult to discover the sources, even though at times the Department of Customs uses secret agents to conduct investigations. But it appears that these influential persons have had several of the secret agents killed. Those who have been arrested are, for the most part, minor personages or just people who have been hired to transport the ore. Also, these suspects are afraid of the influential persons and have, therefore, refused to say anything or reveal the identity of the leaders. This has made it impossible to completely suppress this.

Mr Wira further stated that in suppressing this and making arrests, the smugglers frequently fight back fiercely against the officials with weapons and they use the bags of ore as bunkers from which to shoot at the officials. Also, the smugglers sometimes sink their boats in order to destroy the evidence.

As for the statistics concerning the arrest of smugglers who transport ore out of the country by sea, from 14 October 1979 to 12 June 1980, it appears that six boats used to transport smuggled ore were seized. These boats were carrying 84,134 kilograms of tin ore valued at approximately 20 million baht.

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LANDLESS FARMERS--Mr Anat Aphaphirom, the deputy minister of agriculture and cooperatives, discussed the land problem. He said that this is presently a major problem in Thailand because there are 15 million Thais that are facing problems concerning lacking ownership of the farmland and problems concerning renting farmland. Concerning these problems, even if they have money, these people cannot solve the problems if laws are not made to support them and if the people fail to cooperate as at present. [Text] [Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 9 Aug 80 p 2] 11943

ISOC NOT HOSTILE TO SOCIALISM--Major General Athit Kamlangek, the commanding general of the 1st Division, stated that the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) does not have a policy of encouraging officials to interfere in the affairs of the socialist politicians. The commanding general of the 1st Division stated that if some officials had done this, it was because of their own personal relations with some influential groups and did not involve the ISOC, which has a policy of suppressing only the communists and not people in the country. However, the commanding general of the 1st Division admitted that in a [former] period, the ISOC had made mistakes in carrying out things. But now, he will not allow such things to happen again in the section which he is responsible for. This is because he personally feels that socialism is not communism and that if the socialists hold principles that are of benefit to the country, this is certainly all right. For these reasons, he has never attacked the socialist politicians but has allowed the people themselves to make a decision about them. [Text] [Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 6 Aug 80 p 3] 11943

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